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I. Introduction
The testimony of various regulators at the 1995 Annual Meeting of the Interna-
tional Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) in Paris, France, re-
flected a general consensus that international financial market regulation needs
a new regulatory and supervisory model, if not regulatory and supervisory philos-
ophy. For example, Mr. Andrew Large, Chairman of the United Kingdom's
(UK's) Securities and Investment Board, recognized that both the securities mar-
kets and the nature of the participants in those markets have fundamentally and
dramatically changed. Increasingly, sophisticated trading and risk management
systems and the rise of derivative products that serve to unbundle and reallocate
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risks from instruments or transactions accelerate these changes.' Cross-border
securities transactions are increasing with such velocity that regulators under the
current supervisory framework have considerable difficulties determining which
national regulator has jurisdiction over the varying transactions, the particular
regulatory issues, or the new and differing risks.
Not only do the large securities firms conduct significant securities transactions
that give rise to international regulatory issues, but so also do the large interna-
tional banks.2 However, banking and securities regulators have different ap-
proaches to regulating and supervising their respective entities; though they recog-
nize the need to move toward a more common international regulatory and
supervisory approach. 3
The specific entities within the banking and securities industries (that is, banks,
securities firms, mutual funds, pension funds, and hedge funds) also have internal
institutional risks unique to their particular structures that must be isolated from
the common framework.4 Therefore, Mr. Large further opined that the envisaged
common regulatory/supervisory model should focus on changes in systemic risk
and should "present a coherent risk-based philosophy" to preserve the benefits
of financial liberalization and deregulation. 5 In addition to identifying common
principles and reference points, the risk-based philosophy should properly identify
the risks that different firms pose to the international financial system and that
the system poses to different firms, should consider the role that corporate struc-
tures play in reducing systemic risk, and should focus on the risk of endemic
contagion within these structures.6
Regarding international banks, Mr. Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, Chairman of
the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (Basle Committee), asserted that
the Basle Committee has been the vehicle for regulatory cooperation and the
force behind global supervision for global markets, international acceptance of
consolidated supervision, and clear division of responsibilities between the home
and host country supervisors for cross-border banking groups.7 According to
Mr. Padoa Schioppa, regulators must strive to follow the same supervisory treat-
1. See Andrew Large, President, Securities and Investment Board, Globalization of Risks:
Cooperation Between Banking and Market Regulators, in Public Documents of the XXth Annual
Conference of the International Organization of Securities Commissioners (IOSCO), Paris, 12 July
1995, TOME 1, No. 23, at para. 4.
2. Large, supra note 1, at para. 5.
3. Id. at paras. 9-10.
4. Id. at para. 14.
5. Id. at para. 17.
6. Id. at paras. 17-20.
7. See Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, Chairman, Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Global-
ization of Risks: Cooperation Between Banking and Market Regulators, in Public Documents of the
XXth Annual Conference of the International Organization of Securities Commissioners (IOSCO),
Paris, 12 July 1995, TOME 1, No. 24, at paras. 3-4. On the concept of consolidated supervision,
Schioppa carefully noted that certain securities supervisors "still follow a different approach that
concentrates supervision on the regulated broker-dealer, while certain affiliates are not subject to
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ment for the same activities so that banking and securities regulators can realisti-
cally collaborate on an international level.' The prudential treatment of a given
risk should be the same, whether incurred by banks, securities firms, or insurance
companies, regardless of the location of the financial institution. 9 Schioppa char-
acterized the recent supervisory initiatives regarding international banks as a
movement towards "market-friendly supervision," meaning that banking super-
vision has increasingly aimed at promoting stability in the international financial
system "by enhancing the disciplinary effects of markets rather than by limiting
competition." 0
Financial and technological innovations have rendered the segmentations and
restrictions on the banking and securities markets, such as those engendered by
the U. S. Glass-Steagall Act and Article 65 of the Japanese Securities and Exchange
Law, ineffective to prevent instability and contagion. The proposed supervisory
revolution envisages that regulatory defenses must be developed inside, as op-
posed to outside, the financial markets because advanced telecommunication
technologies resulting in widespread information and capital flows and the increas-
ing sophistication of investors, depositors, and creditors of these institutions instill
discipline that is equal to or better than regulatory discipline." This approach is
founded on two defensive parameters: management control and market disci-
pline. ' 2 Thus, supervisors should improve their knowledge base about new risks
and innovative cross-border transactions and holdings and should introduce suit-
able measures to defend against systemic risk.
13
Considerable optimism currently exists regarding the supervisory agendas of
IOSCO and the Basle Committee. Increasingly, market participants are seizing
the opportunity to draw upon the relative strengths of banking and securities
regulatory cultures to achieve a better coordinated supervisory system. 14 The
focus of banking regulation has traditionally been on the protection of depositors
and payment systems, and regulators have normally relied on direct regulation and
confidential supervision as opposed to market discipline. Securities regulation,
supervision." Id. at para. 4. He was presumably referring to the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission. On the Basle Committee generally, see, inter alia, JOSEPH J. NORTON, DEVISING
INTERNATIONAL BANK SUPERVISORY STANDARDS (Kluwer 1995).
8. Schioppa, supra note 7, at para. 5.
9. Id. at para. 5.
10. Id. at para. 7.
11. Schioppa, supra note 7, at para. 7. For a discussion of the U.S. and Japanese situations,
see J.J. Norton and C.D. Olive, Regulation of Securities Activities of Banks: A Comparison of U.S.
Regulation and Japanese Liberalization, Ch. 5 to INVESTMENT BANKING: THEORY AND PRACTICE
(E. Gardener et al., eds., 1996).
12. Id. at para. 8.
13. Id. at para. 9.
14. See Remarks ofEdwardJ. Waitzer, Chairman, IOSCO Technical Committee, Ontario Securi-
ties Commission, Cooperation Between Banking and Market Regulators: Some Thoughts on the Role
of JOSCO, in Public Documents of the XXth Annual Conference of the International Organization
of Securities Commissioners (IOSCO), Paris, 12 July 1995, TOME 1, No. 25, at 2.
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however, is traditionally rooted in investor protection and the maintenance of
fair and efficient markets. Within such broad parameters, the evolution of risk
management is heavily influenced by market discipline. The revolution in bank-
ing, driven by the expanding activities of the large international banks, lead to
the establishment of international financial groups that warrant the supervision
of both the banking and securities regulators. As national regulators struggle
with issues such as consolidated or coordinated functional regulation, lead regula-
tors, and regulatory arbitrage, regulators must not impose inappropriate regula-
tory constraints on risk-taking activities and competition in a constantly changing
international financial environment driven by the market participants themselves.
Acceleration of the process of market-driven regulatory convergence in finan-
cial services convinced regulators that markets have the capacity to absorb many
disruptive events without coordinated regulatory intervention. As the Chairman
of the IOSCO Technical Committee concluded, this observation underscores the
premise underlying the supervisory revolution: "[dlealing with low-probability
events that pose potentially calamitous consequences.' ' 5 This challenge should
guide the member regulators of IOSCO and the Basle Committee to a more
unified, transparent, global, regulatory framework, led by the more competent
or sophisticated banking and securities regulators.
The globalization of finance further facilitates the need to eliminate inefficient
national regulation. The competitive pressures of the international markets tend
to influence domestic regulatory policy, which in turn underscores the importance
of organizations like IOSCO and the Basle Committee. 16 The international super-
visory efforts regarding international banks and securities firms has matured
and accelerated in all respects in 1995. The international trend of regulatory
convergence is evident in several respects:
(1) International supervisory cooperation and the coordination of national su-
pervision of international banks and securities firms, the difficulties of
which are underscored by inherent gaps in regulatory cooperation and
exchange of information, saw the collapse of Barings plc in February 1995;
and
(2) The enhancement of risk management and other internal controls, the
option of conditional self-regulation, and increased reporting and public
disclosure of complex financial activities.
These premises underscore the importance of regulatory convergence for inter-
national supervision of international banks and securities firms engaged in transac-
tions involving financial derivatives. The event that provided the necessary mo-
mentum for these approaches was the collapse of Barings plc, one of the oldest
and most respected banking groups in the United Kingdom, due to losses in
15. Waitzer, supra note 14, at 2.
16. Id. at 3.
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excess of $1 billion sustained primarily by the General Manager of one of its
subsidiaries in trading financial derivatives.
This article, consisting of three principal sections, is a survey of joint interna-
tional and national supervisory efforts regarding financial derivatives in 1995.
First, the article examines (utilizing the official U.K. and Singapore reports) in
detail the 1995 collapse of Barings plc and the risk management and regulatory
issues relating to internal derivatives controls arising from the collapse. Second,
this article examines the 1995 undertakings of IOSCO regarding exchange-traded
derivatives; and third, the authors evaluate the 1995 IOSCO-Basle Committee
joint initiatives regarding the supervision of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives.
II. Barings, PLC: A Review of the HMSO and Singapore Reports
On February 26, 1995, the High Court of London appointed joint administrators
to manage the affairs of Barings plc, the Barings Group parent company, and
certain other companies within the Barings merchant banking Group. This ap-
pointment resulted in the discovery of massive losses incurred by Barings Futures
(Singapore) Pte Limited (BFS), an indirect subsidiary of Barings plc, principally
through the unauthorized proprietary trading in exchange-traded financial deriva-
tives by Mr. Nicholas Leeson. Mr. Leeson was acting either alone or in concert
as General Manager and Head Trader of BFS on Singaporean and Japanese
exchanges. 17
A. THE HMSO REPORT: REVIEW OF THE BOARD OF BANKING SUPERVISION'S
INQUIRY INTO THE BARINGS COLLAPSE
On February 27, 1995, the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that
he would direct the Board of Banking Supervision (the Board) of the Bank of
England (the Bank) to conduct an investigation into the events leading up to the
Barings collapse. The Bank's Special Investigation Unit (SIU), comprised of
accountants, legal counsel, solicitors, and an expert adviser on derivatives and
risk management, assisted the Board. The Board also assessed the performance
of the relevant UK supervisors, the Bank of England, and the Securities and
Futures Authority (SFA). Only the independent members of the Board conducted
this part of the investigation (that is, the three ex officio members of the Board:
the Governor, Deputy Governor, and Executive Director of the Bank responsible
for Regulation, Supervision, and Surveillance did not particiate). 18 The purpose
of the inquiry was, "To establish in detail the events that led to the collapse of
17. See HMSO, Report of the Board of Banking Supervision Inquiry into the Circumstances of
the Collapse of Barings, issued 18 July 1995, sec. 1, para. 1.1 [hereinafter HMSO Report].
18. See Dr. Maximilian J.B. Hall, A Review of the Board of Banking Supervision's Inquiry into
the Collapse of Barings-Part I, BUTTERWORTH'S J. OF INT'L BANKING LAW (October 1995), at
421 (Hall I).
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Barings; to identify the lessons to be drawn, for institutions, for the Bank's own
regulatory and supervisory arrangements, and for the UK system of regulation
more generally; and to report to the Chancellor of the Exchequer." 1 9 The limita-
tions of the inquiry as well as the Board's general inability to access Singaproe
documents and Barings employees prevented the Board from (i) determining the
motivations and trading strategies behind the unauthorized trading; (ii) verifying
all transactions entered through the unauthorized trading account against records
held by SIMEX; (iii) excluding the possibility that other Barings employees or
third parties participated in this unauthorized trading or in unlawful activities in
connection with this trading; (iv) excluding the possibility that the funding of
BFS's margin requirements and trading activities resulted from misappropriation
of parent company funds; (v) investigating the management's role in the unautho-
rized trading and the BFS's auditors' work; and (vi) reviewing the adequacy of
supervision over BFS by SIMEX or other international regulatory agencies.2"
Nonetheless, the Board produced a rather thorough analysis of the events leading
up to the collapse. This analysis is encapsulated in the "HMSO Report."
1. Introduction: Barings plc
The HMSO Report findings of fact were somewhat hindered because of the
following limitations: Mr. Leeson refused to participate in the inquiry (on advice
of his attorneys) while held in custody in Frankfurt, Germany, pending resolution
of an application for his extradition to Singapore; the Board did not have adequate
access to Barings Group electronic mail messages and taped telephone calls; the
Board did not have access to a significant number of documents and witnesses
in Singapore; and the Board received no cooperation from the Judicial Managers
to BFS, the Singapore Inspectors, the Singapore Ministry of Finance, the Com-
mercial Affairs Department in Singapore, local auditors, and the Singapore Mone-
tary Exchange (SIMEX). 2" However, the Report delineates the principal facts of
the collapse.
At the time of the collapse, Baring Brothers & Co., Limited, was the oldest
merchant banking business in the City of London. Since the foundation of the
partnership in 1762, the partners privately controlled and independently operated
the business. In 1890, BB&C Co. succeeded the original partnership and carried
on the business of the bank. In November 1985, Barings plc acquired the share
capital of BB&C Co. and became the parent company of the Barings Group. In
1991, the Barings Group acquired a 40 percent equity interest in Dillon, Read
& Co., Inc., a U.S. investment bank based in New York.22 BFS, incorporated in
19. HMSO Report, supra note 17, at ch. 1, para. 1.2.
20. Id. at para. 1.78.
21. See Hall I, supra note 18, at 421; HMSO Report, supra note 17, ch. 1, paras. 1.71-1.74
(delineating in detail the significant limitations on access to documents and individuals).
22. HMSO Report, supra note 17, at ch. 1, para. 1.18.
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Singapore on September 17, 1986, was an indirect subsidiary of Baring Securities
Limited (BSL). BSL was incorporated in the Cayman Islands as a subsidiary of
BB&C Co. BSL generally operated through subsidiaries as a broker-dealer in the
Asia Pacific, Japan, Latin America, London, and New York markets.23 Barings
originally formed BFS in 1986 to trade financial derivatives on SIMEX as a
nonclearing member; and in 1992, BFS became a corporate clearing member of
SIMEX. At the time of the collapse, BFS employed Leeson and twenty-three
other staff.24 Mr. Leeson was BFS's General Manager and Head Trader from
late 1992 until the collapse. Prior to his move to Singapore in March 1992,
Leeson worked for Barings in London in a back office capacity for almost three
years. 5 As an international financial conglomerate, Barings sought to control
and to manage its operations through a matrix management scheme, wherein
managers that are based overseas have local reporting lines of an administrative
nature as well as reporting lines to a product manager based in a regional office.26
Thus, Leeson reported to Barings's BFS management in Singapore, and appar-
ently both Leeson and the Singapore management had reporting lines to the
Group-wide support functions in London. 27 According to the findings, this man-
agement system created widespread confusion over exactly who was responsible
for BFS's trading activities.28
2. Unauthorized and Concealed Trading
Beginning in mid-1992, BFS executed trades on SIMEX, the Osaka Stock
Exchange (OSE), the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), and the Tokyo International
Financial Futures Exchange (TIFFE). BFS primarily executed trades in three
kinds of financial futures contracts on the aforementioned exchanges: Nikkei
225 stock index futures; ten-year Japanese Government Bond (JGB) futures; the
three-month Euroyen contract; and options on these financial futures contracts.29
SIMEX, created in 1984, developed parallel markets for these futures and options
contracts in direct competition with the respective Japanese exchanges. Hence,
the different characteristics and rules of the exchanges,3° such as differing margin
requirements, gave rise to advantages for dealing on one exchange in preference
23. Id. at para. 1.20.
24. Id. at para. 1.33.
25. Id. at para. 1.35. A more comprehensive description of Mr. Leeson's career and background
is included in the HMSO Report. See id. at paras. 2.55-2.60.
26. Id. at para. 1.36.
27. Id. at para. 1.36.
28. See, e.g., id. at paras. 2.51-2.65.
29. HMSO Report, supra note 17, at sec. 1, para. 1.37. The market prices of these futures and
options contracts are related to the price or value of the underlying Japanese securities. For example,
the price of the Nikkei 225 index futures contract is related to the value of the Nikkei 225 index of
leading Japanese companies' share prices. For a complete description of these products, see id. at
Appendix V.
30. See id. at ch. 3.
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to the other. 3' BFS's original function was to execute trades on an agency or
riskless principal basis on behalf of Barings clients, most of whom were actually
clients of BSL or Baring Securities (Japan) Limited (BSJ), another subsidiary of
BSL. The agency trading purportedly took advantage of pricing differentials in
these contracts on SIMEX and the Japanese exchanges. This interexchange ar-
bitrage trading is commonly known as "switching." 32
The reported profits from BFS's arbitrage trading over 1993-1994 were enor-
mous. Barings's London management was clearly aware of the profitability of
Leeson's reported trading activities at BFS. In fact, due to Barings's remuneration
policies, many senior members of management and Leeson himself received
substantial bonuses as a direct result of these profits.33 These profits, however,
were in reality offset by much greater concealed losses that were actually incurred
through unreported and unauthorized trading by Leeson 34 in a client error account
created by Leeson on SIMEX, popularly dubbed "account 88888. "3
The trading conducted by BFS on these exchanges required substantial funding
in the form of margin payments to the exchanges to support the positions held
by BFS. BB&Co. proivded most of this funding through BSL and BSJ.36 In sum,
BB&Co. funded the unauthorized trading by (i) monies advanced to BFS by
BSJ and another subsidiary for what these entities understood to be their own
account trading through BFS; (ii) monies advanced by BSL to BFS on BFS's
requests for the payment of margin to the exchanges, which were not effectively
queried, verified, or reconciled to the trading records of clients; and (iii) the use
of artificial trades created to reduce the level of margin calls from SIMEX.37
Incredibly, Barings's London management purportedly believed until several
days before the collapse that the arbitrage trading conducted by BFS was essen-
tially risk-free and extremely profitable.38 The management purportedly believed
that BFS entered into equally offsetting matched positions on particular contracts
31. Id. at ch. 1, para. 1.37.
32. Id. at para. 1.38.
33. See, e.g., id. at paras. 2.81-2.93.
34. A number of devices concealed the unauthorized trading. These devices included the suppres-
sion of account 88888 from London management, the submission of falsified reports to London, the
misrepresentation of the profitability of BFS's trading, and numerous falsified trading transactions
and accounting entries completed by either Leeson himself or the Singapore staff at his direction.
See id. at ch. 13, para. 13.8.
35. HMSO Report, supra note 17, at sec. 1, para. 1.39. See id. at para. 4.2 (attributing the
responsibility for the trading on and accounting for account 88888 to Leeson, and relying on the
observations that (i) he was the senior floor trader throughout 1992-1995, (ii) he was the general
manager of BFS responsible for the back office, (iii) someone opened account 88888 shortly before
he began to use it for trading, (iv) he took responsibility for arranging funding for the account, (v) staff
in Singapore attributed responsibility to him, and (vi) he represented himself to London management as
the person who could answer all queries relating to the trading accounts). See also id. at para. 4.5
(describing account 88888).
36. Id. at sec. 1, para. 1.40.
37. Id. at para. 13.7.
38. Id. at ch.1, para. 1.41.
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on SIMEX and the Japanese exchanges, and reasoned that price movements on
the exchanges would not materially affect the net value of the holdings. 39 How-
ever, Leeson did not have matched positions, but rather was engaged in enormous
unhedged positions.
An internal audit completed in October 1994 raised numerous questions regard-
ing Leeson's activities, including the key fact that he controlled the front and
back office functions of BFS's trading.4 However Barings's London management
was not aware of SIMEX's concerns about Barings's financing of client trades 41
and market concerns about the scale of BFS's trading activities until January
1995 .4' These market concerns apparently did not cause management concerns
because management thought that Leeson's transactions were fully matched
across SIMEX and the Japanese exchanges. By the end of January 1995, however,
management apparently ordered Leeson not to increase his positions and, if possi-
ble, to reduce them with minimal loss. Leeson never complied.
As of December 31, 1994, and unbeknownst to management, BFS's cumulative
proprietary trading losses totaled £208 million.43 By February 27, 1995, however,
these losses increased to £827 million and eventually totaled £927 million after
liquidation. 44 The losses primarily stemmed from futures trading in Nikkei 225
index and JGB contracts45 and unauthorized implied volatility options trading on
these contracts 6 These positions were largely unhedged.47
3. Causes of the Barings Collapse: Management Failures, Inadequate
Internal Controls, and Ineffective External Audits
The Board concluded in the HMSO Report that Leeson's unauthorized and
undetected trading activities and the subsequent Barings collapse were chiefly
39. Id. at para. 1.41.
40. Id. at para. 1.44.
41. Id. at para. 1.46.
42. Id. at para. 1.45. Barings actually received a telephone call from officials at the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) who heard rumors that Barings had margin losses in the Nikkei futures
contracts and could not meet its margin calls. Id.
43. Id. at ch. 4, para. 4.08.
44. See id. at paras. 4.08-4.16.
45. See id. at paras. 4.17-4.49.
46. See id. at paras. 4.50-4.78. Volatility trading in the options market seeks to take advantage
of mispriced options because options become more expensive as market volatility increases. The
market benchmark in determining whether options are expensive or cheap is known as "implied
volatility." Id. at paras. 4.61-4.62. Leeson's apparent option writing strategy followed that of a
volatility trader who believed the Nikkei 225 index would move materially from its normal trading
range and also believed that implied volatility was accordingly trading at levels that could not be
sustained. Id. at para. 4.65.
47. See id. at paras. 4.71-4.72. The strategy that Leeson followed was not inherently complex
and is used by many professional options traders on a daily basis. However, the fact that Leeson
did not hedge his portfolio and had no risk management system in place to properly analyze the
variables inherent in implied volatility left his positions extremely sensitive to small movements in
the market indices. See id. at para. 4.76.
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due to ineffective risk management and inadequate internal control. 48 The Board
specifically emphasized that Barings's management ignored a significant number
of warning signs that, if noticed, would have provided them with ample time to
remove the Barings Group from the brink of insolvency.4 ' These warning signs
included:
(1) The lack of segregation of duties in BFS between the front office (trading)
and back office (settlement), which the internal audit report identified
following the review of BFS's operations in July-August 1994;
(2) the consistently high level of funding required to finance BFS's trading
activities;
(3) the unreconciled balance of funds transferred from Barings in London to
BFS in Singapore for margin payments;
(4) the apparently high level of profitability of BFS's trading activities com-
pared to the low level of risk as perceived and authorized by London
management;
(5) a purportedly unauthorized over-the-counter derivatives transaction en-
tered into by Leeson;
(6) several letters sent to Barings in London by SIMEX that included specific
references to account 88888 and sought adequate assurances regarding
BFS's ability to fund its margin calls in adverse market conditions;
(7) issues and questions arising out of Barings's reporting of large exposures
and client money to supervisors and regulators; and
(8) market concerns about the size of BFS's positions circulating in January-
February 1995.50
The Board observed that these warning signs were not properly addressed
because management and individuals in a number of different departments failed
to face up to, or follow up on, specifically identified problems. 5' In sum, the
Board emphasized that many important internal controls failed within the Barings
Group, especially the supervision of BFS; and that this failure exacerbated the
collapse. The respective failures covered management controls, financial con-
trols, operating controls, organizational elements, and business functions.52 These
failures primarily included a lack of segregation of front and back office trading
duties in Singapore;53 the absence of management supervision over Leeson's
activities at BFS;54 inappropriate funding procedures utilized by the Barings Group
(parent company and subsidiaries) to BFS, with particular focus on settlements,
48. Id. at ch. 13, paras. 13.10-13.11.
49. Id. at para. 13.12.
50. Id. at ch. 1, para. 1.70.
51. Id. at 13.12.
52. See Hall I, supra note 18, at 423.
53. HMSO Report, supra note 17, at ch. 7, para. 7.14; id. ch. 13, paras. 13.13-13.15.
54. See id. at paras. 7.7-7.13; 13.16-13.21.
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credit aspects, and operational financial controls; 55 insufficient responses to
warning signals;5 6 the absence of risk management and compliance functions
at BFS; 57 inadequate follow-up to internal audit recommendations; 58 inadequate
reporting to regulators; 59 and inadequate responses by London management to
SIMEX inquiries in January 1995. 60
The Board topped off its analysis of the management and internal control
failures in connection with the Barings collapse by recommending the following:
(1) management teams have the duty to understand fully the businesses they
manage;
61
(2) management must clearly establish and communicate the responsibilities
for each business activity within the financial intermediary; 62
(3) clear segregation of front office (trading) and back office (settlement) func-
tions in securities trading is critical to any effective control system;
63
(4) management must establish relevant internal controls, including indepen-
dent risk management, for all business activities; 64 and
(5) top management and the audit committee must ensure that significant weak-
nesses, identified to them by internal audit or otherwise, are quickly re-
solved.65
As for the external auditors, the firms involved in the audits of the Barings
Group in London and Singapore from 1992 to 1995 were the local Singaporean
firm of Deloitte & Touche (D&T), the London-based firm of Coopers & Lybrand
(London) (CLL), and Coopers & Lybrand Singapore, a separate partnership
(CLS). 66 D&T audited BFS in 1992 and year-end 1993 and reported to CLL
for inclusion of BFS's statements into the Barings Group consolidated financial
statements.67 The Board did not have access to the working papers or employees
of D&T in relation to BFS.68 Hence, the Board passed no judgment on D&T's
performance, although by that time the BFS accounts consisted of material mis-
statements. 69 The Board recognized that CLL, however, duly accepted and relied
55. Id. at paras. 7.17-7.23; 13.22-13.35. See also id. at ch. 6 (describing BFS funding processes
in detail).
56. Id. at paras. 7.15; 7.29-7.53.
57. Id. at paras. 7.16; 7.25-7.26.
58. Id. at para. 7.24; see also id. Ch. 9 (discussing July-August 1994 internal audit by Barings
Group of BFS).
59. Id. at paras. 7.27; 11.30-11.40; 11.86-11.88; and 13.40-13.43. See also Ch. 11 (discussion
of reporting by Barings to supervisors and regulators).
60. Id. at paras. 7.28; 11.97-11.118.
61. See id. at ch. 14, paras. 14.8-14.11.
62. See id. at paras. 14.12-14.16.
63. See id. at paras. 14.17-14.18.
64. See id. at paras. 14.19-14.27.
65. See id. at paras. 14.28-14.31.
66. Id. at ch. 10, para. 10.2.
67. Id. at para. 10.7.
68. Id. at para. 10.9.
69. Id. at para. 13.44.
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upon D&T's audit in their audit of Barings's consolidated financial statements
for year-end 1993. 70 At the date of the collapse, the CLL audit of the consolidated
financial statements of Barings plc as of year-end 1994 was not complete. 7 The
audit of BFS's 1994 financial statement by CLS, however, was complete.72
Although the Board also did not have access to the working papers or employees
of CLS,73 the Board observed that CLS performed an assessment of BFS's control
environment as part of the audit that was complete by November 1994. The CLS
audit concluded that the controls within BFS were satisfactory, notwithstanding
the lack of segregation between front and back office trading duties.74 As for
CLL, the Board concluded that CLL did not perform sufficient tests to ensure
that the controls over payments of margin and the associated accounting balances
were operating effectively and otherwise did not diligently follow up on question-
able funding procedures." Thus, although the Board could not verify all of the
facts in connection with the performance of the external auditors, the auditors
clearly did not follow up on issues arising from their respective audits.
4. The Supervisory and Regulatory Framework for the
Barings Group and BFS
a. The Bank of England
The Bank of England was responsible for the consolidated supervision7 6 of
the Barings Group.77 Thus, the Bank received and considered data on Barings's
consolidated (group-wide) capital ratios and consolidated large exposures, 78 but
was not responsible for the individual supervision of BFS. The Bank is required
under the Banking Act 1987, however, to account for risks within the group that
might affect the authorized institution (which, in the case of the Barings Group,
70. Id. at para. 10.8.
71. Id. at para. 13.48.
72. See id. at paras. 10.39-10.57 (discussion of facts concerning CLS audit).
73. Id. at para. 10.39.
74. Id. at para. 13.47.
75. Id. at paras. 13.49-13.55.
76. The "consolidated supervision" of a financial group or conglomerate that includes a bank
is supervision that assesses the risks to the bank from the activities of other companies in that
conglomerate. Id. at ch. 12, para. 12.6. This assessment is based on various sources of information,
including the consolidated returns covering the group or conglomerate submitted by the bank. Id.
The Bank of England is obliged to exercise consolidated supervision whenever an authorized institution
is a member of a group or conglomerate. Id. As the Bank of England originally authorized BB&Co.
under the U.K. Banking Act of 1987, BB&Co. was responsible for the consolidated supervision of
the Barings Group. Id. at para. 12.7.
77. Id. at para. 12.7.
78. Section 38(1) of the U.K. Banking Act 1987 is the basis of the Bank's large exposures rules
and requires any U.K. authorized institution to notify the Bank before incurring an exposure (that
is, a loan or other transaction by which it exposes itself to a loss) to a person of more than 25 percent
of its capital base. Id. at para. 12.40. The Bank has since supplemented section 38 with two Notices
to U.K. banks, the second of which (published in 1993, effective January 1, 1994) superseded the
first. Id. at para. 12.41.
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was BB&Co.).79 Hence, the Bank facilitates risk analysis on a consolidated basis
to capture exposures arising in the authorized institution and other connected
subsidiaries, and on an unconsolidated basis to assess the financial position of
the authorized institution itself.° If the connection between an authorized institu-
tion and one of its subsidiaries is particularly strong and certain other criteria
are met, the Bank may permit solo consolidation, when the subsidiary is treated
as a division of the authorized institution and included in the institution's unconsol-
idated prudential returns filed with the Bank.81
The intent behind consolidated supervision is that the subsidiary should be
sufficiently connected to the parent bank that it is treated as the same institution.
If necessary, the parent bank should be able to wind up a solo consolidated
subsidiary quickly and painlessly in times of financial stress. Consolidated super-
vision, as a supplement to solo supervision, can set exposure limits for the bank
and the group of companies of which the bank is a member. 2 Unless otherwise
specified by Bank agreement, the maximum exposure of the bank or the solo
consolidated group to the rest of the group cannot be in the aggregate more than
25 percent of the bank's unconsolidated or solo consolidated capital base.83 This
capital requirement is known as the "connected lending limit."
Although the Banking Act does not address lead regulation, one of the recog-
nized supervisors in the UK will act as the coordinating supervisor for each
financial group.4 The lead supervisor coordinates the various regulators for the
group. In the case of the Barings Group, the Bank acted as the lead supervisor
of the Barings Group.85 If an institution authorized under the Banking Act also
conducts investment business under the Financial Services Act of 1986, the Bank's
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 86 with other Self-Regulatory Organiza-
tions (SROs) gives the Bank primary responsibility for supervising the capital
adequacy and financial position of the institution, thus superseding the responsibil-
79. Id. at para. 12.7.
80. Id. at para. 12.8.
81. Id. at para. 12.9. The subsidiary is monitored for capital adequacy and large exposure
reporting purposes as if it were part of the institution. The requirements for a bank subsidiary to
be solo consolidated with the parent bank are set out in a Bank of England Notice issued in 1993
and include requirements that the management of the solo consolidated subsidiary must be under
the effective direction of the parent bank and that no obstacle can impede payment of surplus capital
up to the parent bank. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at para. 12.10.
84. Id. at para. 12.11.
85. Id.
86. Each Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) contains formal arrangements for the exchange
of information and cooperation in the performance of the Bank's and the relevant SRO's regulatory
functions. The general principle embedded in each MoU concerning exchange of information is that
of "reporting by exception." Matters are not reported to the other regulator unless they give rise
to a concern. Id. The specific manner in which MoU's operate depends on the individual agreement,
but all are based on the presumption that information must flow freely between supervisors. Id. at
para. 12.13.
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ities of other SROs. 7 The primary SRO involved in the regulation of BFS, with
which the Bank maintained such an MoU, was the Securities and Futures Author-
ity (SFA).
b. The Securities and Futures Authority
The Barings Group contained several subsidiaries, notably BSL and BSLL,
that were members of the SFA and thus authorized to carry out certain types of
investment business in the UK.8 8 The SFA directly regulated these firms, while
the Bank served as the regulator of their parent company, BB&Co., as the consoli-
dated supervisor. The SFA, an SRO approved by the Securities and Investments
Board (SIB), is responsible for authorizing and monitoring firms that carry out
investment business as described under the Financial Services Act.89 In the case
of Barings, the SFA was responsible for monitoring that BSL and BSLL had
adequate financial resources and protection for customer assets. 90 BFS was a
subsidiary of BSL, created for the purpose of trading on SIMEX.
The Financial Services Act, however, does not address the particular extent
to which the SFA is required to regulate the operations and financial affairs of
a member firm or its subsidiaries. 91 In general, the SFA does not have any
obligations to member firm subsidiaries (whether UK or foreign) other than those
applicable to ordinary counterparties that expose the member firm to risk. 92 The
SFA also does not have any substantial powers with regard to subsidiaries under
its rules.93 Hence, unlike the Bank of England, the SFA does not engage in
consolidated supervision of a member firm and its subsidiaries.
94
However, in the monitoring of the financial resources of BSL, the Board found
that the SFA would have relevant information on the financial position of its
subsidiaries that could influence the integrity of the member firm.95 Nonetheless,
in relation to subsidiaries of a member firm, the SFA has no power and is under
no duty to regulate the business of nonmember firm subsidiaries; and its duties
and powers are limited to regulating the investment business of the member
firm.96 Thus, with regard to BFS, a clear regulatory and/or supervisory gap
existed, and neither UK regulator would accept direct responsibility for activities
conducted through BFS.
87. Id. at para. 12.12.
88. Id. at para. 12.104.
89. See id. appendix XIV, at paras. XIV.35-XIV.44.






96. Id. at para. 12.106.
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c. The International Supervisory Framework
The concept of "lead supervisor" is recognized internationally in the Basle
Concordat issued by the Basle Committee97 in 1983.9' The Concordat, as revised,
provides the fundamental guidelines for the regulation of international banking
groups. 99 The Bank of England and the Japanese Ministry of Finance (MoF), °°
are participating members of the Basle Committee. The MoF, which supervised
the Tokyo and Osaka branches of BSJ (one of the principal funding mechanisms
for BFS's trading activities), did not issue a supervisory order or take any adminis-
trative action against BSJ with regard to the Barings collapse.' 0 '
Banking supervisors that are not official members of the Basle Committee have
formed committees similar to the Basle Committee. These committees usually
represent a particular geographic area or interest group. 102 The Monetary Author-
ity of Singapore (MAS) is a member of the Offshore Group of Banking Supervi-
sors. In a May 1995 letter to the Board, the MAS indicated that its supervision
of BFS entailed ". . . the review of their financial returns and audit reports,
including SIMEX's ... inspection reports and the proposed disciplinary actions
to be taken against member firms. MAS conducts on-site inspections of merchant
banks. The on-site inspections of futures ... firms are conducted by SIMEX."' 03
The MAS letter clarified that SIMEX was the SRO authorized by the MAS for
futures trading firms and, as such, was responsible for ensuring that its member
firms such as BFS complied with the prescribed rules and regulations of the
exchange. '04 With regard to BFS, SIMEX exercised its primary oversight func-
tions through on-site inspections and general surveillance of BFS's activities on
SIMEX.'0 5 The Board further observed that SIMEX inspected BFS in April 1993
and September 1994 and that BFS was either fined or in the process of being
fined by SIMEX for violations of exchange rules. SIMEX clearly stated its concern
with BFS's operational errors, apparent financing of customer trades, and aggres-
sive market positions on several occasions, only to be reassured by Barings
officials that any problems envisaged with BFS would be resolved.'06
97. The Basle Committee consists of the central banks and banking regulators of the G- 10 countries
plus Switzerland and Luxembourg. The Committee generally meets four times per year to foster
cooperation between banking regulators and establish minimum standards for the supervision of
international banking groups. Id. at para. 12.14.
98. The Basle Concordat, as supplemented in 1990 and 1992, balances responsibilities between
the parent and host supervisory authorities for the regulation of foreign subsidiaries or branches of
respective parent banks. Id. at para. 12.14.
99. Id. at para. 12.14.
100. For a background on regulation in Japan, see id. appendix XIV, at paras. XIV.66-XIV.75.
101. Id. at para. 12.165.
102. Id. at para. 12.15.
103. Id. at para. 12.160.
104. Id. For a background on SIMEX, see id. appendix XIV, at paras. XIV.47-XIV.65.
105. Id. at 12.161.
106. Id. at para. 12.162.
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In 1987, the Basle Committee and the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors
entered into a Document of Understanding that addressed certain aspects of inter-
national coordination between bank supervisors of their respective groups. Thus,
the Concordat and the Document of Understanding provide for the supervision
of international banking groups. The Board asserted that the principles of these
documents are as follows:
(1) effective supervision of banks' foreign establishments requires a sharing
of responsibilities between host and parent authorities and contact and
cooperation between them;
(2) host and parent authorities should try to satisfy themselves that banks'
internal controls include comprehensive and regular reporting between
foreign establishments and the head office;
(3) if a host authority suspects material problems in a foreign establishment,
the host should inform the parent authority; and if serious problems arise
in a foreign establishment, the host authority should consult with the parent
authority to seek possible remedies;
(4) host authorities should ensure that adequate data can flow to parent authori-
ties, particularly in relation to large exposures;
(5) when a host authority discovers an exposure that should be drawn to the
attention of the parent authority, the host authority should do so;
(6) host authorities are responsible for foreign establishments operating in
their territories, while parent authorities are responsible for them as part
of larger banking groups; such responsibilities are both complementary
and overlapping; and
(7) consolidated supervision does not reduce host authorities' responsibilities
for foreign establishments operating in their territories.' 07
Unfortunately, the Board did not have the opportunity to make adequate find-
ings of fact to draw conclusions on how these various supervisors interacted and
coordinated with respect to the Barings collapse. However, the limited findings
make clear that information between the Singaporean and UK regulators regarding
concerns over BFS's trading activities was grossly inadequate.
5. Supervisory Performance and Future Implications
a. The Bank of England
The Board conducted an in-depth review of the performance of the UK
supervisory authorities in relation to the Barings collapse. The Board initially
noted that the Bank of England, although not fully knowledgeable of the early
warning signs of which Barings management was aware, was nonetheless
aware that Barings's East Asian trading activities required a high level of
funding; that these trading activities resulted in a reported high profitability;
107. Id. at para. 12.16. See also id. appendix XIV, paras. XIV.15-XIV.27.
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that Barings's management believed them to be risk-free; and that Barings's
reporting to the Bank of its consolidated large exposures on the OSE and
SIMEX was problematic.'"0 The Board then identified two of the more im-
portant issues in the Bank's supervision of Barings. One issue was whether
the Bank failed (given the scale of the BFS arbitrage operation in Singapore
and Japan, the sums involved, and the importance of the trading profits to
the Group) to take sufficient steps to assure that this supposedly risk-free
operation did not in reality pose a threat to BB&Co.10 9 Another issue was
whether the Bank failed to pursue diligently the outstanding questions regard-
ing Barings's large exposure to OSE and the Bank's grant of an informal large
exposure concession to Barings while questions remained.11 o Other issues of
high significance were the allowance of solo consolidation of BSL with
BB&Co. soon after a major corporate restructuring of the Barings Group and
the connected lending limit concession granted to Barings; . the subject matter
and scope of the reporting accountants.12 reports regarding Barings; 1 13 and the
international coordination between the Bank, SFA, and overseas regulators
in relation to Barings.1 4
In addressing these issues, the Board recognized that the Bank was the consolidated
supervisor of the Barings Group and the lead regulator of BB&Co.," 5 and that the
Bank regarded the controls in Barings as "informal but effective."' 1 6 Thus, the
Board found that such a degree of confidence in Barings senior management entitled
the Bank to greater reliance on management's statements and representations.
Further, the Board found that the Bank did not review Barings's overseas
subsidiaries. Instead, the Bank relied on the auditors and reporting accountants'
statements regarding the existence of the connected lending limits on BB&Co.'s
exposure to the overseas securities subsidiaries. The Bank also relied on the
supervision of BFS by the relevant overseas regulators."1 7
Interestingly, the Bank's consolidated supervision extended to other Barings
Group subsidiaries insofar as their activities would affect BB&Co. 1 8 However,
the Board found that the Bank was entitled to rely on these authorities. 9 The
Board, however, criticized the Bank's supervisory performance as follows:
108. Id. at para. 12.20.
109. Id. at para. 12.22. See also id. at paras. 12.36-12.39; 12.88.
110. Id. at para. 12.22. See also id. at paras. 12.40-12.65.
111. Id. at para. 12.22. See also id. at paras. 12.66-12.88.
112. Under section 39 of the Banking Act 1987, the Bank can require an authorized institution
to commission a report from reporting accountants on any matter about which it can require information
under the Act. See id. at para. 14.52.
113. Id. at 12.23. See also id. at paras. 12.89-12.101.
114. Id. at para. 12.23. See also id. at paras. 12.102-12.103.
115. Id. at para. 13.57.
116. Id. at para. 13.58.
117. Id. at para. 13.58.
118. Id. at para. 13.59.
119. Id. at para. 13.60.
SUMMER 1996
318 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
(1) the Bank should have understood Barings's East Asian operations and
the degree of control that Barings in London exercised over those opera-
tions; 120
(2) the Bank incorrectly granted an informal concession to Barings's large
exposure limits in allowing the Group's OSE exposures to exceed the 25
percent of capital base limit;'
2
'
(3) the Bank incorrectly delayed a decision concerning whether or not to with-
draw the informal concession until February 1, 1995122 (although the Board
was unable to determine whether this delay was a contributory factor to
the eventual Barings collapse); 2 3 and
(4) the Bank displayed a lack of rigour in the solo consolidation of BSL with
BB&Co., which resulted in BSL's inclusion in the unconsolidated returns
submitted by BB&Co. to the Bank and in BSL's treatment as one with
BB&Co. for capital adequacy and large exposure policy. 1
24
The Board then evaluated how the Bank's existing arrangements for the supervi-
sion of financial groups with substantial operations outside of the banking sector
(such as Barings) should be improved.'25 For instance, the Board addressed the
Bank's consolidated supervision of banking groups by recommending that the
Bank:
(a) supplement its traditional collection of data from banking groups concern-
ing their consolidated capital adequacy and large exposures by increasing its
understanding of the nonbanking businesses undertaken by those banking
groups; 1
26
(b) obtain a more comprehensive understanding of how Group Management
controls the risks in those businesses;
12 7
(c) clearly define its relationship with other regulators and effectively coordi-
nate with them;
128
(d) prepare internal guidelines that identify those parts or activities of a banking
group that pose material risks to the bank and delineate the steps the staff
should take to assess and monitor risks;
129
120. Id. at para. 13.61. The Board did observe that no guidelines or systems appeared to be in
place within the Bank to determine whether a member of a banking group for which the Bank was
responsible for consolidated supervision was in a situation that could affect the financial soundness
of the bank. Id.
121. Id. at paras. 13.63-13.64.
122. Id. at paras. 13.64-13.65.
123. Id. at para. 13.66.
124. Id. at paras. 13.67-13.70.
125. Id. at para. 14.33.
126. Id. at paras. 14.34-14.35.
127. Id. at para. 14.35.
128. Id. at para. 14.35.
129. Id. at para. 14.36.
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(e) arrange for meetings with Group management and overseas regulators
concerning foreign operations of banking group subsidiaries;
130
(f) understand the key elements of the management and control structures of
the supervised banking groups;1
3
'
(g) extend the scope of consolidated returns that are currently submitted to
include more information about the businesses and their profitability as a
whole;' 32 and
(h) ensure that the senior management of banking groups clearly understands
and openly acknowledges their responsibility for the accuracy of consoli-
dated returns, and ensure that such returns are signed by a senior director
of the bank. 133
Also, the Board addressed the solo consolidation of BSL with BB&Co. and
initially observed that because of the failure of controls in Barings following
such solo consolidation, funds that as a matter of law constituted loans by BB&Co.
to BSL passed to BFS without limit. 13 Hence, the Board concluded that the solo
consolidation of any active trading entity with a bank should require the formal
approval of an Executive Director of the Bank or one of the Bank's Governors. 135
Moreover, the Board recommended solo consolidation only if every solo con-
solidated entity is supervised and only when practical; the controls within all of
the proposed solo consolidated entities are adequate to ensure that exposures to
companies outside the solo consolidated group are controlled; and the Bank has
the means to receive, on a continuing basis, suitable reassurance regarding such
controls.' 36 Finally, the Board recommended that the Bank prepare internal guide-
lines for its staff as to the procedures for granting solo consolidation and the
supervision of the solo consolidated group. 137
The Board emphasized that the Bank should continue to develop international
coordination among G- 10 banking supervisors; 138 work closely with internal Audit
Committees of banking groups on a regular basis; 139 require major banks to
commission reports on their systems of control over the accuracy of the informa-
tion in the records and to work with the accountancy profession to increase
the standards of reports; '0 and promptly investigate any repeated or significant
breaches of the large exposure rules. 141 Interestingly, the Board did not recom-
130. Id.
131. Id. at para. 14.37.
132. Id. at para. 14.38.
133. Id. at para. 14.39.
134. Id. at para. 14.40.
135. Id. at para. 14.42.
136. Id.
137. Id. at para. 14.43.
138. Id. at paras. 14.44-14.46.
139. Id. at paras. 14.47-14.48.
140. See id. at paras. 14.52-14.55.
141. Id. at para. 14.57.
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mend that the Bank engage in regular on-site examinations of such banks, opining
without clarification that a "... number of disadvantages [are] associated with
this kind of approach.
142
b. Securities and Futures Authority
In considering the SFA, the Board initially observed that the SFA did not
consider the activities or financial position of the subsidiaries of BSL.143 The
Board, however, concluded that the SFA's responsibility for monitoring a member
firm's obligation to maintain adequate financial resources to meet its commitments
and to contain its risks required SFA supervision of the activities and solvency
of that firm's subsidiaries insofar as they are capable of affecting the financial
integrity of the member firm.44 Thus, the Board criticized the SFA's failure to
understand the significance of BSL's operations in Singapore or the level and
nature of BSL's funding of BFS's trading activities. 14
5
The Board then concluded that, due to this gap in understanding and supervi-
sion, the SFA needed to clarify its responsibilities in connection with companies
related to an SFA member firm, especially when the SFA is a party to an MoU
with the Bank of England and the Bank is the lead regulator.46 In addition, the
Board set out a number of further matters for the SFA to take into account in
their own regulatory arrangements, such as:
-assessing the extent to which the SFA communicates with overseas regulators
of companies related to member firms;
-adopting the recommendations made to the Bank concerning communications
with internal auditors and Audit Committees;
-instituting a system of regular meetings with management of member firms;
and
-instituting a system of reviews by reporting accountants similar to that of
the Bank. 147
B. THE SINGAPORE INSPECTORS' REPORT ON BARING FUTURES
(SINGAPORE) PTE LTD.
On March 9, 1995, following the collapse and purchase of much of the Barings
Group by the Dutch financial conglomerate Internationale Nederlanden Groep
(ING), the Singaporean Minister for Finance under Section 231 of the local
Companies Act appointed two partners of Price Waterhouse to investigate the
142. Id. at para. 14.51.
143. Id. at para. 13.75.
144. Id.
145. Id. at para. 13.77.
146. See id. at appendix VIII (Memorandum of Understanding Between the Securities and Futures
Authority and the Bank of England on the Financial Supervision of Banks).
147. See id. at appendix XV.
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affairs of BFS and to report their findings to the Minister. 148 The Inspectors,
assisted in part by local solicitors and the British law firm of Clifford Chance,
carried out the investigation and delivered the report to the Minister for Finance
on September 6, 1995.'49 The Inspectors limited their analysis in the Singapore
Report to a detailed reconstruction of the facts, circumstances, and causes of the
collapse of BFS and the Barings Group. 5 0 Although the Inspectors did not focus
on investigating any fraud or collusion by Leeson, they did have an opportunity
to review many of the relevant documents and to assess the conduct of many of
the relevant officers and employees of the Baring Group and BFS.' 51 The Singa-
pore Report designated many issues that had a significant impact on the collapse
of the Barings Group, some of which were entirely different from those examined
by the Board of Banking Supervision.
These issues included:
(1) whether the organizational structure and controls were weak, particularly
with respect to Leeson, which resulted in ineffective monitoring or control
of his activities; 
152
(2) to what extent the internal audit identified warning signals that ought to
have alerted the Baring Group to the need to monitor and control Leeson
more closely; 15
3
(3) to what extent the Compliance Department was responsible for checking
Leeson and his activities;"
(4) to what extent a proper system monitored the Baring Group's risk expo-
sure and the role of the Asset and Liability Committee (ALCO) consisting
of Barings Group executives;
1 55
148. See Baring Futures (Singapore) Pte Ltd., The Report of the Inspectors Appointed by the
Minister for Finance (issued Sept. 6, 1995) (hereinafter the Singapore Report).
149. See Maximilian J.B. Hall, A Review of the Singapore Inspectors' Report on Baring Futures
(Singapore) Pte Ltd., BUrrERWORT'S J. OF INT'L L. (December 1995), at 525 (hereinafter Hall
III).
150. Id. at 525; Singapore Report, supra note 148, ch.I , para. 1.14.
151. Singapore Report, supra note 148, at ch. 1, para. 1.15.
152. See id. at para. 2.40(i). See also id. at paras. 4.3-4.12 (merger of BSL and BB&Co.); para.
4.27 (describing dangers inherent in utilization of matrix management scheme); paras. 4.28-4.30
(describing Leeson's control of both the front and back office functions); paras. 4.31-4.34 (describing
inadequate management coordination over BFS's activities and confusion over proper reporting lines).
153. Id. at para. 2.40(ii). See also id. at paras. 5.32-5.34 (reviewing internal audit findings of
numerous warning signals but recognizing the failure to initiate action on such findings).
154. Id. at para. 2.40(iii). See also id. at para. 6.4 (compliance officer denying that she had
responsibility over BFS's activities); para. 6.7 (acceptance of front running in trading for clients by
BFS); para. 6.14 (recognizing that, given compliance officer's limited view of the scope of her
duties, Leeson could not have felt restrained in his trading activities).
155. Id. at para. 2.40(iv). See also id. at paras. 7.5-7.8 (observing that no independent risk and
compliance officer existed in Singapore for BFS); paras. 7.9-7.30 (describing duties and responsibilit-
ies of ALCO); paras. 7.31-7.37 (observing that ALCO clearly did not serve its purpose as a risk
and control committee with regard to BFS).
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(5) how did BSL Settlements identify and resolve the concerns that stemmed
from Leeson's activities; 1"'
(6) how did Group Treasury deal with the funds requested by Leeson to
maintain his trading positions;'57
(7) what were the roles of Financial Controls and Credit Control in relation
to Leeson's activities;1
5 8
(8) to what extent the Financial Products Group and its senior managers
may have contributed to Leeson's ability to function in the way that
he did;
159
(9) how the events escaped the supervisory reporting regime; 60 and
(10) to what extent external controls may have been negated.' 6 1
In considering each of these issues, the Singapore Report reviewed the docu-
ments, parties, and corporations involved to a far greater extent than the Board's
HMSO Report. The Singapore report also directed and/or apportioned fault to
certain individuals under each issue.162 In many instances, the Inspectors directly
questioned the credibility of the management they interviewed against the back-
ground of facts. The Inspectors especially suspected of a cover-up by Barings'
senior management, a possibility accepted by the HMSO Report but not fully
explored because of limited access to personnel and information.163 In most other
respects the Singapore Report reaffirmed the findings of the HMSO Report,
including those findings related to the supervisory performance of the Bank of
England. The Singapore Report also supported its conclusions with extensive
factfindings.
In other respects, however, the Singapore Report surpassed the HMSO Report
in criticizing SIMEX for having concerns about BFS's activities, not following
up on them with urgency, and not informing the Monetary Authority of Singapore
156. Id. at para. 2.40(v). See also id. at para. 8.35 (observing that the failure of BSL Settlements
to avert the collapse of the Barings Group was "condemnable").
157. Id. at para. 2.40(vi). See also id. at Ch. 9 (details of Group Treasury's activities in relation
to the collapse).
158. Id. at para. 2.40(vii). See also id. at paras. 10.22-10.24 (observing that the Group Finance
Director did not adequately perform his duties and that he was aware of warning signals regarding
BFS but failed to follow up on them); id. at para. 11.12 (observing that if Credit Control attempted
to analyze the funds remitted to BFS or the clients who purportedly received advances, Leeson's
activities would have been exposed).
159. Id. at para. 2.40(viii). See also id. at paras. 12.20-12.24 (observing that although Leeson
had control of both the front and back offices of BFS, management should have questioned the
credibility of such high profits from arbitrage activities and understood the nature of the activity to
make sufficient inquiries).
160. Id. at para. 2.40(ix). See also id. at ch. 13.
161. Id. at para. 240(x). See also id. at chs. 14-15.
162. For an excellent summary of these voluminous findings, see Hall III, supra note 149, at
526-27.
163. See id. at 527-28 (reviewing findings of the Singapore Report in this regard).
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(the central bank of Singapore) of these concerns;164 being insufficiently sensitive
to the risks associated with the very large volume of business transacted by BFS
and overly liberal in granting increases in position limits;' 65 and failing to dili-
gently initiate enforcement actions against BFS, relying instead on the parent
institution's reputation or on foreign regulatory authorities supervising the activi-
ties of the head office of such an institution. 1 6 Finally, the Singapore Report
observed that SIMEX was implementing a comprehensive risk management pro-
gram to prevent the accumulation of unacceptable risk exposure in the Exchange
and to ensure that clearing members have sufficient financial resources to support
their positions.' 67 Singapore also amended the Futures Trading Act, effective on
April 1, 1995, to strengthen the supervision of futures.
61
C. THE ING ACQUISITION
Barings plc, the parent company, and a number of other Barings Group compa-
nies went into joint receivership on February 26, 1995, following BFS's enormous
trading losses. The Administrators and the Bank of England soon approved a
bid for most of the Barings Group companies by ING, and the acquisition received
final approval in the High Court in London on March 6, 1995.169 In the acquisition,
ING agreed to cover the Leeson trading losses and to inject £660 million into the
Group's operations, but declined to acquire the holding company. 1 0 All Barings
Group creditors, except subordinated bondholders with holdings of £100 million,
were fully compensated, but the shareholders received nothing. '' Initially, ING
retained all staff, including those in the Singapore offices of BFS, although in
May 1995, ING dismissed twenty Barings executives involved in the crisis.1 2
After BFS's failure to meet a margin call on February 27, 1995, SIMEX success-
fully petitioned the Singapore High Court to place BFS with Judicial Managers.
1 73
In addition to the investigations by the MAS Inspectors, the SFA and SIMEX
both conducted independent investigations of their own. As of this writing (March
1996), the SFA inquiry into the Barings collapse was not complete.
164. Id. at para. 15.41.
165. Id. at para. 15.42.
166. Id. at para. 15.43.
167. Id. at para. 15.46.
168. Id. at para. 15.47.
169. See Dr. Maximilian J.B. Hall, A Review of the Board of Banking Supervision's Inquiry into
the Collapse of Barings-Part 11, BuTrERWORTH'S J. OF INT'L BANING LAW (November 1995),




173. Id. at 473.
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III. International Initiatives in the Supervision of Exchange-Traded
Derivatives (Post-Barings): The Windsor Declaration (May 1995)
In direct response to the Barings collapse and its implications on the regulation
of exchange-traded futures markets, the leading international futures authorities
met at Windsor, England, in May 1995 to address many of the problematic issues
raised by the collapse. The historic meeting and the ensuing Windsor Declaration
called for increased cooperation in regulation and exchange of information among
the futures authorities. The SIB and the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission (CFTC) jointly hosted the meeting. The meeting's delegates, including
representatives of the Technical Committee of IOSCO and the regulatory bodies
from sixteen countries responsible for supervision of the world's leading futures
exchanges (including the MAS and MoF), endorsed the issuance of a Declaration
outlining the steps they proposed to strengthen the supervision of the international
futures markets. 7 4 Not surprisingly, these steps addressed many of the issues
raised in the HMSO and Singapore Reports. In particular, the authorities agreed
to support, subject to appropriate confidentiality protections, mechanisms to im-
prove prompt communication of information relevant to material exposures and
other regulatory concerns; review the adequacy of existing arrangements to mini-
mize the risk of loss through insolvency or misappropriation and to enhance
such arrangements when appropriate; promote national provisions and market
procedures that facilitate the prompt liquidation and/or transfer of positions,
funds, and assets, from failing members of futures exchanges; and support mea-
sures to enhance emergency procedures at financial intermediaries, market mem-
bers, and markets and to improve existing mechanisms for international coopera-
tion and communication among market authorities and regulators. 7 5 The futures
authorities proposed further cooperative efforts in issues related to international
cooperation between market authorities; protection of customer positions, funds,
and assets; default procedures; and regulatory cooperation in emergencies.1 76
Further, the futures authorities agreed to promote:
(1) active surveillance within each jurisdiction of large exposures by market
authorities and/or regulators;
(2) the development of mechanisms to ensure that customer positions, funds,
and assets can be separately identified and protected;
(3) enhanced disclosure by the markets of the different types and levels of
174. See Securities and Investment Board Press Release No. 3845-95, SIB and CFTC Chairmen
Welcome Windsor Declaration (May 17, 1995). The regulators attending the Windsor Meeting in-
cluded the relevant futures authorities of Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United States,
and the United Kingdom. See Windsor Declaration, infra note 175, at Annex 1.
175. See Windsor Declaration, sec. I, at 2 (May 17, 1995) (on file with the Banking & Finance
Law Unit, Centre for Commercial Law Studies, University of London).
176. Id. sec. II, at 4.
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protection of customer funds and assets, particularly when they are trans-
ferred to different jurisdictions and through omnibus accounts;
(4) record-keeping systems at exchanges and clearing houses;
(5) enhanced disclosure by exchanges to participants of the rules and proce-
dures governing default and the treatment of positions, funds, and assets
of member firms and their clients in the event of such a default;
(6) the immediate designation by each regulator of a contact point for receiving
information or providing other assistance to other regulators and/or market
authorities and the means to ensure twenty-four hour availability of contact
personnel in the event of a disruption at a financial intermediary, market
member, or market;
(7) review of existing lists and assuring maintenance by IOSCO of an interna-
tional regulatory contacts list; and
(8) the development by financial intermediaries, market members, or markets
and regulatory authorities of contingency arrangements, or a review of
the adequacy of existing arrangements."'
Finally, the authorities jointly recommended that the IOSCO Technical Com-
mittee further consider various issues related to cooperation between market
authorities; protection of customer positions, funds, and assets; default proce-
dures; and regulatory cooperation in emergencies. 178 At the IOSCO Annual Meet-
ing in July 1995, all IOSCO members endorsed the Windsor Declaration. 179
Notable post-Barings initiatives regarding exchange-traded derivatives also
occurred at the national level in 1995. For example, in November 1995 the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) of the United States announced new
guidelines for examiners on derivatives related to futures brokerage activities.
The guidelines, issued as a direct result of the Barings collapse, apply to national
bank subsidiaries that operate as futures commission merchants (FCMs) registered
with the CFTC. "W
IV. International Initiatives in OTC Derivatives Supervision:
1995 IOSCO-Basle Committee Joint Reports
A. IOSCO-BASLE COMMITTEE FRAMEWORK FOR SUPERVISORY INFORMATION
ABOUT THE DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES OF BANKS AND SECURITIES FIRMS
(MAY 1995)
The release of the Windsor Declaration, which focused on the international
coordination of the exchange-traded derivatives markets, coincided with the re-
177. Id. at 3.
178. Id. at sec. III.
179. See Press Release, IOSCO Moves on Windsor Declaration, in Public Documents of the XXth
Annual Conference of the International Organization of Securities Commissioners (IOSCO), Paris,
13 July 1995, TOME 2, No. 41, at 2.
180. See OCC News Release No. 95-122, OCC Issues Derivatives Guidance for Bank Examiners
on Futures Brokerage, OCC NR 95-122 (Nov. 9, 1995), available on LEXIS.
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lease of a report jointly authored by the IOSCO Technical Committee and the
Basle Committee in May 1995 entitled Framework for Supervisory Information
About the Derivatives Activities of Banks and Securities Firms [hereinafter the
Joint Derivatives Report]. This initiative represented a combination of the efforts
individually undertaken by IOSCO and the Basle Committee in July 1994, wherein
they each issued very similar risk management guidelines for derivatives under
a common press release.18 1 The Joint Derivatives Report concentrated on the
task of improving and harmonizing supervisory reporting of OTC derivatives
activities. 182
The overall supervisory information framework advanced in the Joint Deriva-
tives Report consisted of two components: a catalogue discussing data that the
Committees identified as important for an evaluation of derivatives risks and that
supervisors may choose from as they expand their reporting systems, and a
common minimum framework of data elements to which relevant supervisory
authorities should have access. s3 The Joint Derivatives Report provided that
national supervisors, in monitoring the activities of large international financial
institutions involved in significant derivatives activities, must be satisfied that
the institution in question has the ability to measure, analyze, and manage risks
from both a qualitative and quantitative standpoint. The quantitative elements of
the supervisory focus include obtaining and evaluating institution-specific infor-
mation on credit risk, liquidity risk, market risk, and earnings from derivatives
activities.'84 In considering these risks and factors, the Joint Derivatives Report
continuously stressed that supervisors must distinguish between exchange-traded
and OTC derivatives activities in identifying the information needed for supervi-
sory assessment.
The qualitative elements of the supervisory focus, on the other hand, would
include obtaining and evaluating information concerning the specific institution's
systems, policies, and practices for measuring and managing the derivatives risks
and, most importantly, information on the risk limits that banks and securities
firms use to manage their exposures and any changes in these limits.1"5 The
Joint Derivatives Report identified the major institution-specific risks inherent
181. See Basle Committee and Technical Committee of IOSCO (Joint Report), Framework for
Supervisory Information about the Derivative Activities of Banks and Securities Reports (May 1995)
(Joint Derivatives Report). This Joint Report draws from the following: IOSCO Technical Committee,
Working Party No. 3, Operational and Financial Risk Management Control Mechanisms for Over-
the-Counter Derivatives Activities of Regulated Securities Firms (July 1994); and Basle Committee
on Banking Supervision, Prudential Supervision of Banks' Derivatives Activities (Dec. 1994). These
guidelines are an official adaption and reinforcement of the approach suggested earlier by the industry
itself in the Group of Thirty (G-30) Report. See Group of Thirty, Derivatives: Practices and Principles
(1993).
182. Schioppa, supra note 7, at para. 10.
183. Joint Derivatives Report, supra note 181, at sec. I, para. 4.
184. Id. at sec. II, para. 17.
185. Id. at para. 18.
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in derivatives activities and the quantitative and qualitative factors and methods
of assessment of these factors that national supervisors should consider in evaluat-
ing such institutions.
1. Credit Risk
The Joint Derivatives Report defined credit risk as the risk that a derivatives
counterparty may fail to fully perform on its financial obligations. Credit risk
is of greater concern in OTC derivative contracts because, with exchange-traded
derivatives, the various exchanges have clearing houses for derivative transactions
and use risk management systems that substantially mitigate credit risks to their
members. 18 6 The Joint Derivatives Report segregated the credit risk analysis into
the following five components.
a. Current Credit Exposure
The Joint Derivatives Report defined" current credit exposure" as the measure-
ment of the cost of replacing the cash flow of OTC derivative contracts with
positive mark-to-market value if the counterparty defaults on its obligations. 87
This cost is called the replacement cost. The Report recognized that legally
enforceable bilateral netting agreements can significantly reduce the amount of
credit risk to counterparties and can extend across different derivative product
types. 88 Hence, the Report concludes that an institution's current credit exposure
is best measured as the positive mark-to-market replacement cost of all derivative
products on a counterparty-by-counterparty basis, thus accounting for bilateral
netting agreements. "'
b. Potential Credit Exposure
The Joint Derivatives Report recognized that prudent analysis should focus
on replacement cost at given points in time and on its potential to change over
time. Hence, "potential credit exposure" is defined in the Report as the exposure
of the OTC derivative contract that may be realized over the remaining maturity
due to movements in the rates or prices of the underlying. '9 As recent amendments
to the 1988 Basle Capital Accord guidelines for credit risk already incorporate
potential OTC derivatives credit exposure for banks, 9' the Joint Derivatives
186. Id. at paras. 20-2 1. Both futures and options exchanges typically mark derivative exposures
to market each day. Futures exchanges eliminate exchange members' exposures to the clearing house
through variation margin payments. Regarding options exchanges, clearing house exposures to written
options are fully collateralized. Id. at para. 20 n.5.
187. Id. at para. 22.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at para. 24.
191. In April 1995, the Basle Committee issued final rules regarding capital requirements for
exposure to credit risk in transactions involving OTC derivatives, which amend the 1988 Capital
Accord. See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Basle Capital Accord: Treatment of Potential
Exposure for Off-Balance Sheet Items (Apr. 1995). Credit risk is addressed in the sense of treatment
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Report opined that supervisors should base their assessments on this data.' 92
However, the Report also recognized that most large banks and securities firms
have sophisticated simulation models to evaluate potential credit exposures more
precisely, but that such models are dependent upon and influenced by the parame-
ters used in the model. 193 The Joint Derivatives Report suggested that if supervi-
sors decide to allow such institutions to use their own internal models to gauge
this exposure, they should discuss the parameters of the various models to ensure
an appropriate level of understanding and confidence in the use of such models. 94
c. Credit Enhancements
The Joint Derivatives Report recognized that information on credit enhance-
ments used in connection with OTC derivative transactions is important to the
assessment of credit risk in OTC derivative positions. Such credit enhancements
are normally in the form of collateral or initial margin payments held against the
current exposure of derivative contracts with counterparties, and may effectively
reduce credit risk.1 95 The Report opined that the quality and marketability of
such collateral, and whether this collateral is in excess or equal to the institution's
netted current exposure to that counterparty, is particularly important to the
supervisors in this regard. 96
d. Concentration Risk
The Joint Derivatives Report defined this risk as the significant counterparty
OTC derivatives credit exposure relative to the institution's capital base. The
Report suggested that supervisors identify and focus upon the ten largest counter-
parties to which individual institutions are exposed and whether they present
netted current and potential credit exposure above a certain predetermined thresh-
old.' 97 The Report also recommended that supervisors limit counterparty exposure
to an aggregated basis (not limited to single types of derivative instruments),
taking into account the nature and scope of interinstitutional off-balance sheet
relationships; and that supervisors monitor concentration risks such as and overex-
of potential exposures to OTC derivatives contracts by recognizing the risk-reducing effects of enforce-
able netting arrangements between counterparties. The treatment of OTC instruments such as forward
contracts, swaps, purchased options, and other derivatives merit special consideration with regard
to credit risk and market risk in the treatment of potential exposures under capital adequacy regimes.
192. Id. In the Basle Capital Accords, potential credit exposure is measured by the add-on, which
is calculated as: [Kx gross or effective notional principal] x [conversion factor based upon the
volatility of the underlying]. Effective notional principal may be obtained by adjusting the notional
amounts to reflect the true exposure of derivative contracts that are either leveraged or otherwise
enhanced by the structure of the transaction. Id. at para. 24 n.6.
193. Id. at para. 25. These models are generally based upon probability analysis and simulation
models that estimate the volatility of the underlying and the expected movements of the underlying
on the derivative contract over time. Id.
194. Id. at para. 25.
195. Id. at para. 26.
196. Id. at para. 27.
197. Id. at para. 28.
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posure of counterparties to certain exchanges and issues and within certain busi-
ness sectors, countries, or regions.'"
e. Counterparty Credit Quality
The Joint Derivatives Report recognized that credit risk is dependent upon both
the credit exposure to the counterparty and the probability of the counterparty's
default, and this recommended that supervisors focus on the current and potential
credit exposure to counterparties of various credit quality and the respective
probabilities of credit loss.99 The Report further recommended that supervisors
consider bilateral netting agreements, credit ratings assigned by rating agencies,
credit enhancements used by counterparties, or the institution's internal credit
evaluation system, to make such assessments.2°
2. Liquidity Risk
The Joint Derivatives Report identified two basic types of liquidity risk associ-
ated with derivative instruments: market liquidity risk and funding risk.2 1
a. Market Liquidity Risk
Market liquidity risk is defined in the Report as the risk that supervisors take
that a derivatives position cannot be eliminated by either liquidating the instrument
or establishing an offsetting position. Again, the Report suggested that supervisors
distinguish between exchange-traded and OTC derivative instruments because
market illiquidity differs between OTC and exchange-traded markets due to the
customized nature of some OTC derivative contracts.2° 2 These contracts often
include fundamental elements or combinations of market risk that cannot be
easily replicated using the more standardized exchange-traded contracts or OTC
contracts.0 3
The Joint Derivatives Report recommended that supervisors further segregate
market liquidity risk into market values of derivative contracts by type, maturity,
and the availability of alternative hedging strategies or substitute instruments.0 4
In addition, the Report recommended that supervisors understand the particular
derivatives markets in which they are participating, especially in the case of OTC
derivative contracts, because these markets often involve contracts tailored to
the specific needs of clients and the process of marking-to-market is normally
more difficult for these contracts than for the standardized and liquid exchange-
traded contracts.205 The Joint Derivatives Report further recognized that unwind-
198. Id. at paras. 29-30.
199. Id. at para. 31.
200. Id.
201. Id. at para. 32.
202. Id. at para. 33.
203. Id. at para. 33 n.8.
204. Id. at para. 33.
205. Id. at para. 34.
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ing OTC derivative positions quickly would, in most instances, be more difficult
than for exchange-traded positions.2t0
b. Funding Risk
The Joint Derivatives Report defined funding risk as the risk that derivatives
activities will place adverse funding and cash flow pressures on an institution.
The Report advised that funding risk is best considered on a consolidated basis
across all financial instruments, including but not limited to derivative con-
tracts.207 The Report again differentiated between OTC and exchange-traded de-
rivative contracts, given the requirements for margin and daily cash settlement
for exchange-traded instruments and the ensuing demands for liquidity that large
positions in such instruments could mandate. 20 8 The Joint Derivatives Report
suggested that, in addressing funding risk, supervisors should also consider the
following factors: the inclusion of collateral or margin requirements in OTC
derivative contracts for assessing liquidity risk; information concerning the ex-
pected cash flows and timing of those flows over the life of derivative instruments;
OTC derivative contracts' subjection to any triggering agreements;209 institutions'
sensitivity analyses of the effect of adverse market developments on their funding
requirements; and the provision of additional collateral or margin calls in these
contracts.21 °
3. Market Risk
The Joint Derivatives Report defined market risk as the risk that the value of on-
or off-balance sheet positions will decline before the positions can be liquidated or
offset with other positions. The Report suggested that supervisors assess informa-
tion on market risk by product type for the entire institution, and further considered
these risks to be relative to the market risks of other instruments, individual
portfolios of clients specializing in nonstandardized OTC derivative contracts,
and proprietary and nonproprietary trading and dealing. 2n The Joint Derivatives
Report recommended that supervisors could alternatively consider position data
that would allow for independent supervisory assessment of market risk through
206. Id.
207. Id. at para. 35.
208. Id. at para. 36. The primary example is when significant positions in OTC derivative contracts
are hedged with exchange-traded contracts. Id. This occurs in the OTC derivative markets to a large
extent.
209. "Triggering agreements" generally contain contractual provisions that require the liquidation
of the contract or the posting of additional collateral if certain events, such as credit downgrading
by a credit agency, occur over the life of the contract. If an institution assumes larger positions in OTC
contracts with such agreements, this change could increase funding risk by requiring the liquidation of
contracts or the pledging of additional collateral when the institution is already experiencing financial
stress. Id. at para. 37.
210. Id. at paras. 36-38.
211. Id. at para. 39.
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the use of a supervisory model or monitoring criteria and data derived from an
institution's own internal estimates of market risk.2"2
The Joint Derivatives Report further advised that for institutions whose deriva-
tives activities are end-user rather than dealer oriented, supervisors should proba-
bly consider position data by product type or from a supervisor-derived frame-
work.21 3 As alternatives to evaluating position data, the Report suggested that
supervisors evaluate information on an institution's internal market risk estimates,
such as from their internal value-at-risk models214 or other information on earn-
ings-at-risk,2 5 duration or gap analysis, scenario analysis, or other approaches.2 6
Supervisors should evaluate the institution's internal models by comparing past
estimates of risk with actual results and by assessing the major assumptions
included in the parameters of the given models. 7
Finally, the Joint Derivatives Report recommended that supervisors ensure
that institutions with large trading activities subject their portfolios to regular
stress tests using various assumptions and scenarios. 8 Supervisors should per-
form worst case scenarios on an institution-wide basis with identification of the
major assumptions used in the test.210 Supervisors are directed to consider both
quantitative information generated by these tests and qualitative information re-
garding the actions that management would take under particular scenarios.22°
To minimize regulatory burden, the Report suggests that supervisors focus on
obtaining information that is already required under alternative rules to minimize
burdens of regulatory compliance.
The Basle Committee and IOSCO already endorse these recommendations in
212. Id. at paras. 39-40.
213. Id. at para. 41.
214. "Value-at-risk" models involve the assessment of potential losses due to adverse movements
in market prices of a specified probability over a defined period of time. Id. at para. 42.
215. Under mark-to-market accounting, value-at-risk will equal earnings-at-risk, as changes in
value are reflected in earnings. If accrual accounting is applied to certain positions, value-at-risk
and earnings-at-risk will differ because earnings would not reflect all changes in value. Id. at para.
42 n9.
216. Id. at para. 42. In evaluating value-at-risk models, supervisors should evaluate both the
methodology and the main parameters of the model, including (i) the volatility (both implied and
historical) and correlation assumptions of the model, (ii) the holding period over which the change
in portfolio value is measured, (iii) the confidence interval used to estimate exposure, and (iv) the
historical sample period over which risk factor prices are observed. Id. at para. 43. However, because
static value-at-risk measurements would not provide information as to the relative speed at which
derivative positions can be modified, the Joint Report recommended that supervisors require institu-
tions to communicate information on the highest value-at-risk number.
217. Id. at para. 44. The Report of the Euro-Currency Standing Committee entitled Public Disclo-
sure of Market and Credit Risks by Financial Intermediaries, issued in September 1994 (the Fisher
Report), discusses factors to consider in interpreting value-at-risk measures. Id. at para. 44 n10.
218. Id. at para. 45.
219. Id.
220. Id. at para. 45. The Report provided that examples of scenarios for interest rate risk include
a parallel yield curve shift of a determined amount, a steepening or flattening of the yield curve,
or a change of correlation assumptions. Id.
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their separate capacities. The Basle Committee proposed (April 1995)221 and
issued final rules (January 1996)222 amending the 1988 Capital Accord to provide
for particularized capital requirements for exposure to market risk in transactions.
These final rules provide that international banks can either develop and adhere
to their own internal value-at-risk models, subject to certain conditions and param-
eters imposed by supervisors, or follow a standardized approach developed by
the Basle Committee. The IOSCO Technical Committee similarly issued a report
considering the implications of increased use of value-at-risk models by securities
firms,223 and in the United States the Derivatives Policy Group also developed
standards based on the use of such models.
4. Impact on Earnings
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the Joint Derivatives Report is the
recommendation that supervisors obtain information on the profitability of deriva-
tives activities and related on-balance sheet positions from institutions and then
separate the income of derivatives trading activities from other dealing-related
activities.224
a. Trading Purposes
The Joint Derivatives Report recommended that, just as sophisticated market
participants should view cash and derivative instruments as ready substitutes and
the management of both is often aggregated, supervisors should separate trading
revenues according to risk classes (that is, interest rate risk, foreign exchange
risk, and commodities and equities exposures) without regard to the type of
instrument producing the trading income. This separation would enable supervi-
sors to better understand the level of overall trading risk of the institution.225
Moreover, the Report recommended that supervisors classify income from com-
221. See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Proposal to Issue a Supplement to the Basle
Accord To Cover Market Risks (Apr. 1995); Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Planned
Supplement to the Capital Accord To Incorporate Market Risks (Apr. 1995); Basle Committee on
Banking Supervision, An Internal Model-Based Approach To Market Risk Capital Requirements
(Apr. 1995).
222. See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Amendment to the Capital Accord To Incorpo-
rate Market Risks (Jan. 1996).
223. See IOSCO Technical Committee, The Implications for Securities Regulators of the Increased
Use of Value at Risk Models by Securities Firms, in Public Documents of the XXth Annual Meeting
of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), Paris, 13 July 1995, TOME
2, No. 39.
224. Joint Derivatives Report, supra note 181, at para. 47. As accounting standards and valuation
techniques either differ among countries or regulatory (or lack of regulatory) schemes, the Joint
Report recognized that such information would probably not be comparable across jurisdictions. Id.
at para. 48.
225. Id. at para. 49. If the systems of banks or securities firms do not already accomplish this
segregation of trading income, the Joint Report suggested simplifying assumptions to approximate
the segregation. d. at para. 50.
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plex instruments exposed to both interest rate and foreign exchange risks ac-
cording to the primary substance of exposure of the instrument.226
To better evaluate an institution's performance relative to its risk profile, the
Joint Derivatives Report suggested the further segregation of trading income
within each risk category into origination revenue; credit spread revenue; and
other trading revenue. 2 7 Material trading losses within a particular risk category
would thus indicate deficiencies in an institution's risk management system in
228that category.
b. Purposes Other Than Trading
The Joint Derivatives Report advised that supervisors should evaluate informa-
tion related to end-user derivatives holdings and focus especially on the effect
of reported earnings on off-balance sheet positions held by the institution to
manage interest rate or foreign exchange risk. 229 To determine whether certain
derivative instruments are in fact being used for risk management purposes, the
Report recommended that this information be measured with information on other
factors affecting net interest margins and interest rate sensitivity.23 °
c. Identifying Unrealized or Deferred Losses
The Joint Derivatives Report recommended that supervisors establish mecha-
nisms to detect the material accumulation of unrealized losses or losses that are
realized but deferred by the institution. Recognition of such material accounting
losses prior to their required reporting could indicate deficiencies in an institu-
tion's internal controls and accounting systems.231
d. Derivatives Valuation Reserves and Actual Credit Losses
The Joint Derivatives Report recommended that supervisors monitor (i) an
institution's valuation reserves established for derivatives activities; and (ii) sub-
stantial credit losses on derivative instruments suffered during the period. This
information would be used to evaluate how adverse changes in derivatives risks
would affect an institution's financial condition and earnings.232
The Report concluded by recommending that member supervisors choose their
regulatory approaches from the common minimum framework catalogue of data
items listed above for large internationally active banks and securities firms with
significant derivatives activities. The common minimum framework would repre-
sent a baseline of information important for supervisors to use in assessing the
nature and scope of an institution's derivatives activities and how derivative
226. Id. at para. 50.
227. Id. at para. 51.
228. Id.
229. Id. at para. 52.
230. Id.
231. Id. at para. 53.
232. Id. at para. 54.
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instruments contribute to an institution's overall risk profile.233 The Report sug-
gested that such a common minimum framework could support the efforts of the
Euro-Currency Standing Committee of G-10 Central Banks to regularly collect
aggregate market data on the derivatives activities of financial institutions, the
disclosure of which could serve useful supervisory functions.234
B. IOSCO-BASLE COMMITTEE REPORT ON PUBLIC DISCLOSURES OF TRADING
AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES OF BANKS AND SECURITIES FIRMS AND
ACCOMPANYING RECOMMENDATIONS (NOVEMBER 1995)
The May 1995 Joint Derivatives Report established the basic international
framework for the supervision of financial derivatives activities of large financial
groups. This framework represents the international basis for the development
of quasi-uniform standards, and against which national supervisory guidelines
will be considered. However, national and international supervisors, as well as
shareholders and other investors of the banks and securities firms engaged in
significant derivatives activities, must have the appropriate information to con-
sider the extent of their derivatives risks. Thus, although improved regulatory
and public disclosure of derivatives activities could never replace international
supervision, improved disclosure is a "most important support" to supervision
by international supervisory authorities.2 35 The objectives of supervision can be
reinforced through the public disclosure of information about how a bank's or
securities firm's trading activities contribute to its overall risk profile and profit-
ability and how well the bank or securities firm manages the risks arising from
these activities.
Moreover, enhanced disclosure will provide the bank or securities firm with
a detailed picture of the risk profile of its counterparties, resulting in improved
risk management procedures over time. Improved disclosures of risk profiles
can also lessen the opportunities for market rumors and misunderstandings by
other market participants in periods of financial stress.
Prior to November 1995, the common minimum regulatory reporting frame-
work envisaged by the IOSCO Technical Committee and the Basle Committee
focused on credit risk and the overall market activities of an institution's trading
and derivatives businesses. 36 However, in issuing the Joint Report on Public
Disclosure of the Trading and Derivatives Activities of Banks and Securities
Firms in November 1995 (hereinafter the Disclosure Report), these Committees
extended the reporting framework from regulatory reporting to the public disclo-
sure of credit risk and trading and derivatives activities and the market risks
233. Id. at sec. III, para. 56. See also Annexes 3 & 4, infra (tabular information of the suggested
common minimum framework for supervising derivatives activities of financial institutions).
234. Id. at para. 57.
235. Schioppa, supra note 7, at para. 15.
236. Id. at para. 15.
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they present. The Committees intended for the Disclosure Report to provide
internationally active banks and securities firms with the type of information
provided by their peers at the international level and with recommendations for
further improvements in banks' and securities firms' public disclosures about
their trading and derivatives activities.237
The Disclosure Report provided an overview of the trading and derivatives-
related disclosures of large G-10 international banks and securities firms in their
1994 annual reports on a consolidated basis,238 and made recommendations for
further improvements in disclosure practices. The institutions reviewed consisted
of sixty-seven banks and twelve securities firms, with primary focus on institutions
as dealers, rather than end-users, of derivatives.2 39 These institutions represented
the largest banks and securities firms involved with derivatives in their countries,
as measured by the total notional amounts of derivative instruments.2 40 Disclosures
by these institutions differed widely in the level of quantitative disclosure and
in discussion of the scope of trading and dealing activities.
In reviewing these disclosures, the Disclosure Report emphasized succinct,
illuminating disclosures about the major risks managed by an institution and the
potential impact of these risk management activities on earnings. The Disclosure
Report asserted that disclosures improved in general compared to similar 1993
annual reports. In particular, a number of international financial institutions pro-
vided quantitative information on market risk exposures drawn from their internal
risk management systems, more information on credit risk exposures, and ex-
panded management discussions of trading and derivatives activities.2 41
237. Disclosure Report at (Executive Summary). The recommendations drew on the concepts
developed in the Discussion Paper on Public Disclosure of Market and Credit Risks by Financial
Intermediaries (the Fisher Report), released by the Euro-currency Standing Committee of the G-10
central banks in September 1994 and on the Framework for Supervisory Information About the
Derivatives Activities of Banks and Securities Firms released jointly by the Basle Committee and
IOSCO Technical Committee in May 1995.
238. Disclosure on a consolidated basis is essential to an understanding of the overall trading and
derivatives activities of a bank or securities firm. However, the Joint Report emphasizes that for
purposes of evaluating an institution's credit risk or other aspects of a counterparty's risk profile,
the financial condition of individual subsidiaries and affiliates within the consolidated group is very
important. Id. sec. II, at 3. A majority of the large dealer institutions have derivatives subsidiaries
or affiliates that are overcapitalized and maintain a AAA credit rating even when the parent may
not be similarly rated.
239. Id. sec. II, at 4.
240. Again, the internationally active banks and securities firms covered in the Joint Report do
not include the subsidiaries of those entities. Hence, Luxembourg banks are not included in the
analysis, since the large dealers and end-users of derivatives located in Luxembourg are subsidiaries
of banks centered in other G-10 countries. Id. at 4 n.7. Moreover, in many jurisdictions sampled,
the largest institutions involved in securities activities are either universal banks or majority-owned
subsidiaries of internationally active banks.
241. Id. at 5. Thus, in order to avoid double-counting, the securities firm section of the Joint
Report focused on the stand-alone securities firms of the United States and Japan. Finally, the
Report excluded the securities firms in France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and one major U.S.
broker-dealer, CS First Boston, Inc., as firms in those countries and CS First Boston, Inc., are
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The Disclosure Report recognized, however, that significant differences in
levels of required disclosures existed across jurisdictions, and that some major
institutions continued to disclose very little about their derivatives activities. The
Report suggested that differences in detail and content of public disclosures could
be attributed to a number of factors, including statutory provisions and other
national standards and requirements for accounting and disclosure; the informa-
tional needs communicated by investors, creditors, and other professionals; dif-
ferences between public disclosure and reporting to supervisors; and the impor-
242tance of derivatives activities to a particular firm's overall business activity.
Nonetheless, the Report recognized that most of the institutions similarly em-
ployed risk measurement and management systems that generated information for
use by corporate management and the board of directors; and provided supervisors
with extensive information, often on a confidential basis, about their trading
and derivatives activities through periodic reports, on-site examinations, and
discussions with senior management. For instance, as part of the Derivatives
Policy Group's "Framework for Voluntary Oversight," the major U.S, securities
firms that are derivatives dealers acknowledged that they are providing to U.S.
supervisors detailed credit risk and market risk information on the OTC deriva-
tives activities in their unregulated entities.243
The majority of the institutions disclosed derivatives activities on a consolidated
basis in two main sections of the annual report: Management's Discussion and
Analysis (MD&A) and the annual financial statements, with footnotes presenting
data both in narrative and tabular form. 2 4
1. Qualitative Information
The Disclosure Report stated that a majority of institutions discussed in some
form the various risks associated with their trading and derivatives activities and
their processes for controlling their exposures and provided a general discussion
of the objectives and strategies of their trading. Institutions identified the manage-
ment groups responsible for setting trading policies and described the managerial
functions responsible for ensuring policy compliance. In addition, a majority
of institutions discussed in some detail the accounting policies for derivative
transactions in the 1994 annual reports, and more than half of the institutions
provided a discussion of the methods and assumptions used in valuation of com-
plex financial instruments, including derivatives. Although more than half of the
institutions discussed measurement and control of credit and market risks, far
less than half of the institutions provided a discussion of the control of operating
subsidiaries of bank holding companies. Id. As such, these entities are included as applicable in the
disclosure analysis for the large, internationally active banks, as are the securities activities of the
major universal banks in the G-10 countries. Id.
242. Id. at 5.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 6.
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and legal risks. And very few institutions discussed whether or not they used
leveraged derivatives contracts.245
2. Quantitative Information
The Disclosure Report observed that institutions continued to expand the finan-
cial reporting of derivatives activities in their annual reports. First, almost all
of the institutions identified the notional amounts of their derivatives holdings
and provided further instrument detail on their derivatives positions.
Second, almost half of the banking institutions and all of the securities firms
identified their trading derivatives positions. Most banks distinguished between
exchange-traded and OTC contracts, and the securities firms generally identified
and qualitatively described the trading characteristics of derivative instruments
(listed versus over-the-counter) within the context of an overall discussion of the
firm's business products and services.
Third, almost half of the banks and securities firms provided either a combined
maturity schedule (trading and nontrading positions) of their derivatives holdings
or a maturity schedule for trading positions.
Fourth, less than half of the banks but all of the securities firms distinguished
trading account assets from trading account liabilities, and a significant number
of banks and securities firms disclosed the derivatives and cash instruments held
for trading purposes at year-end.
Fifth, for the first time, a small number of banks and securities firms provided
reporting period averages for the market values of their derivatives and cash
instruments held in the trading account.
Finally, institutions continued to provide more information about their non-
trading derivatives activities.246
a. Credit Risk
A significant number of banks provided more information on credit risk, partic-
ularly in relation to the risk-based capital credit-equivalent amounts of deriva-
tives.2 47 For example, with respect to securities firms, the most significant increase
in credit risk disclosure was in the area of counterparty credit quality. Moreover,
almost half of the banks provided information concerning gross positive market
value or gross replacement cost without including the risk-reducing benefits of
netting arrangements or collateral, as well as current credit exposure.248 Also,
a significant number of banks and securities firms provided information on the
credit quality of their derivatives portfolios along with a breakdown of their
derivatives credit exposure either by rating agency gradations, internal ratings,
245. Id. at 6-7.
246. Id. at 8.
247. Id. at 9.
248. Id.
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or for banks, by categories similar to those of the 1988 Basle Capital Accord.
Further, almost half of these institutions published information concerning credit
exposure concentrations for their derivatives portfolios, in some instances by
industry and/or geographical concentration.
However, only a small number of banks separately identified their potential
credit exposure,249 provided a measure of the volatility of credit exposure25 ° arising
from derivatives, reported the value of collateral and other credit enhancements
connected with their trading and derivatives activities, or reported information
about their derivatives losses or nonperforming contracts."'
b. Market Risk: Trading and Nontrading Activities
The Disclosure Report recognized that one of the most important changes
in 1994 disclosures was the provision by eighteen institutions of quantitative
information drawn from their risk management systems on their exposures to
market risk.2 52 The majority of institutions disclosing market risk exposures used
the value-at-risk approach, combining cash and derivative instruments. Almost
half of these institutions provided daily value-at-risk graphical data, and others
provided an average value-at-risk estimate for the 1994 reporting period. A num-
ber of banks and securities firms differentiated in their disclosures between propri-
etary and client-related trading activities, and others provided the information
by broad underlying risk factors. Banks provided information of the statistical
assumptions and aggregation criteria underlying their value-at-risk estimates, and
a number of them also provided for the first time information on the actual changes
in the value of the portfolios to which the value-at-risk estimates applied to enable
report users to gauge performances in managing market risk exposures.
The major U.S. securities firms, as part of the Derivatives Policy Group's
"Framework for Voluntary Oversight" on OTC derivatives, provided to U.S.
supervisors on a quarterly basis measures of "capital-at-risk," defined as the
maximum loss expected to be exceeded with a probability of 1 percent over a
two-week period. These firms also provided the results of a series of core risk
factor stress tests of their OTC derivatives portfolios.253
The most common nontrading derivatives activities disclosures the banks re-
viewed that used derivatives for nontrading purposes involved schedules of no-
tional amounts, maturities, and, for swaps, contractual rates paid and received.254




252. Id. at 10.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 11.
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manage interest rate risk of banks was a gap position schedule,255 used by almost
half of the banks reviewed. However, very few banks furnished quantitative
information on their value-at-risk measures related to nontrading derivatives,
disclosed the duration of derivatives held for risk management purposes, or identi-
fied whether the derivatives related to specific components of the balance sheet
or to management of overall risk exposure.256
c. Earnings: Trading and Nontrading Activities
The Disclosure Report found that a significant majority of the banks and securi-
ties firms provided information on the impact of their trading activities on earn-
ings, but very few institutions reported their trading income by risk category,
line of business, cash-market, and derivative instruments combined, or type of
derivative instrument. However, a number of banks and securities firms distin-
guished between earnings from cash instruments and from derivatives portfo-
lios.257
Eleven banks disclosed the details of how derivative instruments that are held
for nontrading purposes affected accrual-based accounting income and expense.2 58
A similar number of banks and half of the securities firms reported the overall
net effect on net interest margins of their nontrading derivatives activities, and
several fewer banks disclosed deferred gains or losses on nontrading derivatives
or on when deferrals would be reflected in future earnings. Finally, eighteen banks
and three securities firms disclosed the unrealized gains and losses associated with
nontrading derivatives positions."29
3. Disclosure Report Recommendations
The Committees' recommendations followed two principal themes. First, insti-
tutions should base enhanced disclosures on information drawn from their own
internal risk management and measurement systems. Enhanced disclosures should
enable financial statement users to assess a firm's performance in managing
material exposures to credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk, and the impact of
trading and derivatives activities on earnings.2 ° Second, institutions should pro-
vide financial statement users with transparent disclosure on their trading activities
and overall involvement in the OTC and exchange-traded derivatives markets;
255. Gap position schedules disclosed by banks organize financial assets and liabilities according
to maturity in a number of time intervals. The difference between assets and liabilities in each time
interval (gap or net exposure) forms the basis for assessing interest rate risk. Derivatives of various
maturities can be used to adjust the net exposure of each time interval to alter the overall interest
rate risk of the institution. Id. at 11 n.9.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 11.
258. When instruments are not marked to market with gains and losses recognized in income,
but are instead accounted for on a historical cost basis. Id. at 11.
259. Id. at 11-12.
260. Id. sec. III, at 13.
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the impact of these activities on earnings; their performance in managing risk
in trading these instruments; and qualitative disclosures presenting an overview
of an institution's overall business objectives, risk-taking philosophy, how trading
and derivatives activities fit into these overall objectives, and the internal control
mechanisms in place to manage these activities. 26' The Committees also encour-
aged institutions to consider the common minimum framework presented in the
May 1995 Joint Derivatives Report as a basis for these disclosures.262
a. Qualitative Disclosures
In particular, the Disclosure Report advocated that banks and securities firms
provide key summary information concerning specific risk management controls
and accounting and valuation methods. Regarding specific risk management con-
trols, the Report urged disclosures of organizational structure and internal controls
for trading and derivatives activities, major risks and the processes used to manage
and measure these risks, the specific trading and derivatives activities, descrip-
tions of nontrading derivatives activities, and high-risk instruments such as lever-
aged derivatives.263 Regarding accounting and valuation methods, the Report
urged disclosures of the accounting policies, methods of income recognition
applicable to trading activities, standards used for derivatives activities (such as
termination of contracts, hedge accounting, and balance sheet netting of deriva-
tives transactions), the valuation methodologies used, and whether adjustments
are made after positions have been marked-to-market. 2' 6
b. Quantitative Disclosures
The Disclosure Report further urged disclosures of market activity, credit risk,
and market liquidity inherent in an institution's trading and derivatives activities.
This disclosure would include information about the composition of trading port-
folios, involvement in the OTC and exchange-traded derivatives markets, credit
risk and market liquidity for derivatives contracts, whether derivatives are used
for trading or nontrading (hedging) purposes, counterparty credit quality and the
existence of credit enhancements, nonperforming derivatives contracts and losses
sustained from such trading, and internal methodologies used to collect and evalu-
ate these types of information.265
The Report focused on two primary areas of disclosure in this regard: market
risk and earnings. First, with regard to disclosures related to the measurement
and management of market risk, dealer banks and securities firms should produce
daily information on profits and losses on their trading activities for internal risk
management purposes. 6 Quantitative disclosures related to market risk should
261. Id. at 13-14.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 15.
265. Id. at 16-17.
266. Id. at 17.
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include discussion of the major assumptions and parameters necessary to under-
standing an institution's market risk disclosures.267 Second, with regard to disclo-
sures related to earnings, the Report urged disclosures on all related issues and
a discussion of the accounting principles used.
The Report asserted that the lack of harmony in accounting standards should
not preclude significant disclosure of institutions' risk management activities, as
such disclosures convey information that current national accounting conventions
may not yet provide.2 68 The Report referred institutions to the Joint Derivatives
Report for appropriate items of disclosure under earnings from trading and deriva-
269tives activities.
V. Concluding Observations
The Barings collapse represents a textbook example of a systemic breakdown
among the internal controls of a financial group; the failure of respected national
supervisory authorities to carry out their mission; and the failure of national
supervisors to coordinate and exchange information on a cross-border basis to
prevent the collapse of a well-respected banking group. Directors and officers
of international financial intermediaries can draw many lessons from this incident.
The crucial failure of internal controls in this example was the lack of separation
of front office (trading) and back office (settlement) functions at BFS. This lack
of separation is the principal reason that Leeson avoided detection for so long.
In sum, sound internal risk management procedures and simple inquiries by
management would have revealed the existence of Leeson's concealed account
and consistent losses accumulated therein, as well as the enormous unhedged
positions taken by Leeson across the Asian exchanges over January-February
1995.
The Barings collapse immediately called into question the Bank of England's
unwillingness to bail out the Barings Group using public funds; the damage done
to the reputation of the City of London as an international financial center; and
the Bank of England's post-Barings decision to overhaul its style of supervision,
especially in its decision to avoid regular on-site inspections of banking groups
267. Id.
268. Id. at 18.
269. Id.
270. For example, if positions are hedged, then derivatives contracts or positions running into
deficit should be offset by futures contracts showing a surplus. As the negative positions must be
covered by margin payments in exchange-traded derivatives, surpluses should exist in the hedged
contracts and the net margin payment should always be close to zero. If the Barings management
simply checked whether or not the other derivatives contracts had unrealized surpluses, the surpluses
would have indicated that the supposedly offsetting or matched contracts were not entered into
and hence positions were unhedged. See John Board, Charles Goodhart, Michael Power, and Dirk
Schoenmaker, Derivatives Regulation, Special Paper No. 70, London School of Economics and
Political Science Financial Markets Group (March 1995), at 14.
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(as opposed to the U.S. federal banking regulators). 271 The HMSO and Singapore
Reports concerning the Barings collapse encapsulate a saga of failed internal
controls and risk management of financial conglomerates that regulators should
closely study as they refine national and develop international risk management
agendas for financial groups.
A more troubling point, however, is that this systemic breakdown of both
national and international supervision could occur such a short time after the
BCCI crisis. The destabilizing effects of that collapse, although perpetrated by
massive fraud, money laundering, and other criminal activities, could also have
been uncovered much earlier if national banking and securities regulators prac-
ticed effective international supervisory coordination of such cross-border finan-
cial groups.272
The HMSO and Singapore Reports made clear that, just as in the BCCI incident,
international coordination and cooperation were ineffective until the true damage
was complete. The BCCI and Barings Group crises taken together mandate that
international coordination and cooperation in the supervision of financial con-
glomerates, especially those utilizing the matrix management scheme, are equally
as important as national supervisory efforts.
The regulatory fallout from the BCCI and Barings collapses has certainly
accelerated this process, which officially began in 1993 when the Basle Committee
and IOSCO joined forces to supervise international financial conglomerates and
published separate papers on this subject.273 In early 1993, at the initiative of
the Basle Committee, an informal Tripartite Group of banking, securities, and
insurance regulators (an informal group with representatives from each of the
G-10 countries, Luxembourg, and the European Commission) examined supervi-
sion of financial conglomerates.2 74 In July 1995, the Tripartite Group released
a report entitled "The Supervision of Financial Conglomerates" (the Tripartite
Report),275 the purpose of which is to synthesize the views of the Tripartite Group
271. Hall II, supra note 169, at 473.
272. For a detailed inquiry into the BCCI crisis, see HMSO Report, Return to an Address of the
Honorable the House of Commons, Inquiry into the Supervision of the Bank of Credit and Commerce
International (Oct. 22, 1992).
273. See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, The Supervision of Financial Conglomerates,
text included in report number 8 on International Developments in Banking Supervision (Sept. 1992);
International Organization of Securities Commissions, Principles for the Supervision of Financial
Conglomerates (Oct. 1992). Several other supervisory and regulatory groups within the financial
community have explored the regulation of financial conglomerates. See Banking Advisory Committee
of the Commission of the European Communities, Financial Conglomerates, XV/1008/92-EN-Rev. 1
(Oct. 21, 1992); Working Group of the Conference of Insurance Supervisors of the European Eco-
nomic Community, Financial Conglomerates (Apr. 9, 1992); The Insurance Committee of the Com-
mission of the European Communities, Financial Conglomerates, XV/2009/93 (Feb. 15, 1994).
274. Schioppa, supra note 7, at para. 11.
275. See THE SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES: A REPORT BY THE TRIPARTITE
GROUP OF BANKS, SECURITIES AND INSURANCE REGULATORS (issued July 1995) (hereinafter Tripar-
tite Report).
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members, to identify problems that financial conglomerates pose to supervisors,
and to consider ways in which these problems could be resolved. Many of the
views expressed by the Board of Banking Supervision in the HMSO Report are
directly reflected in the Tripartite Report.
Notwithstanding the supervision of financial conglomerates, the Barings col-
lapse also triggered much more extensive discussions regarding the international
supervision of financial derivatives. Overall, the HMSO and Singapore Reports
emphasized that the breach of internal guidelines and the failure of internal risk
management controls caused the Barings collapse, not the misuse of financial
derivatives. Although the trading of financial derivatives per se did not cause the
Barings collapse, the leverage involved in unhedged futures and options positions
unquestionably resulted in much greater levels of risk than simple interexchange
arbitrage. This leverage accelerated the losses incurred by the Barings Group
by over £600 million over January-February 1995 alone.
In terms of an evolving international supervisory framework, both the Joint
Derivatives Report and the IOSCO-Basle Disclosure Report will undoubtedly
serve as valuable international guidelines for national supervisors to utilize in
regulating their respective issuers. However, a primary point left untouched by
the Disclosure Report was the extent of disclosure that should be required from
end-users of OTC derivatives, and whether the standards applicable to major
international OTC derivatives dealers should extend to end-users whose deriva-
tives activities are significant enough to warrant such disclosure.
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has taken the initiative in
December 1995 and proposed several amendments to SEC Regulations requiring
disclosures of derivatives activities by registrants. These proposals are directly
in line with the IOSCO-Basle Committee Disclosure Recommendations.276 After
conducting a series of reviews of the annual statements of over 500 corporate
issuers, the SEC apparently concluded that enhanced disclosure of derivatives
activities was necessary at both the dealer and end-user levels.277
In general,27 the proposed SEC amendments require disclosure of derivatives
activities from several perspectives. For example, the Release proposes clarifica-
tion and expansion of existing requirements for financial statement footnote dis-
276. See Proposed Amendments to Require Disclosure of Accounting Policies for Derivative
Financial Instruments and Derivative Commodity Instruments and Disclosure of Qualitative and
Quantitative Information About Market Risk Inherent in Derivative Financial Instruments, Other
Financial Instruments, and Derivative Commodity Instruments, Securities Act Release No. 33-7250,
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-36643, 1995 SEC LEXIS 3464 (Dec. 27, 1995) [hereinafter
Disclosure Release].
277. See Disclosure Release, supra note 276, 1995 SEC LEXIS 3464, at *6-7.
278. The Disclosure Release is a complex document full of terms of art, including U.S. accounting
terms, and is specifically tailored to other existing SEC rules and regulations. The summary in this
article is only a summary. For a complete analysis, see the Release itself.
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closures for certain derivative instruments if a given registrant engages in signifi-
cant or material279 derivatives activities.280
Also, the SEC Release would require disclosure outside the financial statements
of qualitative and quantitative information concerning market risk inherent in
such instruments. The qualitative disclosures would focus on either the fair values
of such instruments or the potential loss in future earnings, fair values, or cash
flows of such instruments from "reasonably possible market movements.'"28
Further, the Release would require enhanced disclosure of derivatives activities
that affect other reported items and discussion of these effects in the Management's
Discussion and Analysis (MD&A)282 section of the disclosure documentation.283
The Release would purportedly require derivatives disclosures of both U.S. and
foreign registrants.
In conclusion, the Windsor Declaration and the IOSCO-Basle Committee joint
reports are premised upon improved international coordination and cooperation
in the regulation of exchange-traded and OTC derivative contracts and the strong
desire to avoid the collapse of another large financial group. Exchange-traded
derivatives, such as those involved in the Barings crisis, are traded on exchanges
regulated either by SROs of the exchange itself, subject to the oversight supervi-
sion of other supervisory authorities, or by the supervisory authorities themselves.
These regulations provide for the trading of standardized futures and options
contracts OTC derivatives; clearance and settlement of trades through a central
clearinghouse, often with rules specifically designating margin requirements upon
its members to ensure the liquidity of trading and the mitigation of credit risk
in the clearinghouse; exchange rules whereby officials can ensure the financial
stability of members; and exchange rules governing the actual trading of deriva-
tives, including antifraud rules, antimanipulation rules, related provisions, and
position limits. For example, such rules on SIMEX allowed for exchange officials
and other supervisors to liquidate the BFS portfolio in an orderly fashion without
causing systemic disruption in trading on the exchange or neighboring Japanese
exchanges due to the massive exposures that Leeson's trading incurred. If BFS
maintained a large OTC, as opposed to an exchange-traded derivatives portfolio,
the impact of its failure would have been quite different on the rest of the interna-
tional financial community.
279. The materiality of derivatives activities, as proposed in the Release, would be measured by
the fair values of DFI and DCI at (i) the end of the reporting period; and (ii) during the reporting
period. Id. at *7. "Fair value" is defined in the Release to have the same meaning as the term is
defined by U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). See FASB, Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 107, Disclosures About Fair Value of Financial Instruments (FAS 107)
(Dec. 1991), at para. 5.
280. 1995 SEC LEXIS 3464, at *7.
281. Id. at 3464, *7-8. For the definition of "fair value" as set out in the Release, see supra
note 279.
282. See, e.g., Item 303 of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR s. 229.303 (1995).
283. 1995 SEC LEXIS 3464, at *9-10.
VOL. 30, NO. 2
